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PREFACE 
T h i s  work ing  p a p e r  d i s c u s s e s  and c l a s s i f i e s  t h e  problems o f  
management c o n t r o l  i n  ' n o n - p r o f i t '  a c t i v i t i e s .  A f t e r  f u r t h e r  
d i s c u s s i o n  a n  e x t e n d e d  v e r s i o n  w i l l  b e  p r e p a r e d  as a Research  
R e p o r t ,  which s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  a b a s i c  r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t  f o r  f u r t h e r  
developments .  The work d e s c r i b e d  i s  a n a t u r a l  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  
a u t h o r ' s  p a s t  work,  b u t  t h e  immediate  s t i m u l u s  w a s  t h e  s t u d y  o f  
s t r a t e g i c  m o n i t o r i n g  o f  h e a l t h  s y s t e m s  u n d e r t a k e n  i n  t h e  Management 
and Technology A r e a  by Mark C a n t l e y  i n  1978/79. A r i s i n g  from t h i s  
work a j o i n t  s e m i n a r  w a s  h e l d  w i t h  t h e  European I n s t i t u t e  f o r  
Advanced S t u d i e s  i n  Management i n  B r u s s e l s  o n  t h e  t o p i c  o f  ' C o n t r o l  
Systems and  P r o c e s s e s  i n  P u b l i c  and N o n p r o f i t  O r g a n i z a t i o n s '  and 
t h i s  p a p e r  i n c o r p o r a t e s  some o f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  a r i s i n g  a t  t h a t  
c o n f e r e n c e .  The g e n e r a l  q u e s t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  ' n o t - f o r - p r o f i t  
a c t i v i t i e s '  r e m a i n s  o f  v i t a l  i n t e r e s t  f o r  s y s t e m s  a n a l y s t s  s i n c e  
s o  much o f  t h e i r  work i s  d e v o t e d  t o  s u c h  a c t i v i t i e s .  T h i s  p a p e r  
i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  a t o p i c  t h a t  is c e n t r a l  t o  IIASA's 
i n t e r e s t s .  
P r o f e s s o r  H o f s t e d e  h e l d  a p a r t  t i m e  a p p o i n t m e n t  a t  IIASA from 
J a n u a r y  t o  December 1979. H e  i s  a s o c i a l  p s y c h o l o g i s t  w i t h  p a r -  
t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  i n  p rob lems  o f  management c o n t r o l  and v a l u e  
sys t ems  and  h a s  r e c e n t l y  w r i t t e n  a book t o  b e  p u b l i s h e d  by Sage  
p u b l i c a t i o n s  conce rned  w i t h  v a l u e  s y s t e m s  i n  f o r t y  c o u n t r i e s .  
R o l f e  Tomlinson 
Area Chairman 
Management and Technology Area 
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G e e r  t Hof s t e d e  
INTRODUCTION 
I n  t h e  West-European and US l i t e r a t u r e ,  it i s  customary t o  
speak of "management c o n t r o l n  p r i m a r i l y  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of  t h e  
p r i v a t e  ( o r  a t  l e a s t  independent ly  f u n c t i o n i n g )  , p r o f i t - o r i e n t e d  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  There are no u n i v e r s a l l y  accep ted  d e f i n i t i o n s  of 
t h e  words "management" and " c o n t r o l " ,  b u t  t h e  connota t ion  o f  
"management c o n t r o l n  is a  pragmat ic  concern f o r  r e s u l t s ,  ob t a ined  
through people .  One d e f i n i t i o n  by an  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  US a u t h o r  is: 
"management c o n t r o l  is  t h e  p roces s  by which managers a s s u r e  t h a t  
r e sou rces  are o b t a i n e d  and used e f f e c t i v e l y  and e f f i c i e n t l y  i n  
t h e  accomplishment of  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  o b j e c t i v e s "  (Anthony, 
1965: 17) . Management c o n t r o l  i n  t h i s  s e n s e  i s  one of t h e  main 
t a s k s  of most managers, i n  which they  are u s u a l l y  a s s i s t e d  by 
some formal  c o n t r o l  systems ( such  as budget ing  and performance 
a p p r a i s a l )  . I n  E a s t e r n  Europe, t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  concept i s  " a p p l i e d  
c y b e r n e t i c s " ,  and t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  a r e  p r i m a r i l y  sought  i n  pro- 
d u c t i o n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  I t  i s  much more r a r e  t o  f i n d  t h e  "manage- 
ment c o n t r o l "  concept  a p p l i e d  t o  p u b l i c  or vo lun ta ry  not- for-  
p r o f i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  t h e  W e s t ,  and t o  non-production a c t i v i t i e s  
i n  t h e  E a s t .  Y e t  an  i n c r e a s i n g  p a r t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  
both i n  E a s t  and W e s t  are s p e n t  on t h e s e  l a t t e r  types  of  a c t i v i -  
t ies.  Even w i t h i n  t h e  produc t ion  and/or p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  t h e r e  
i s  a s h i f t  from d i r e c t l y  p roduc t ive  a c t i v i t i e s  ( t o  which t h e  man- 
agement c o n t r o l  concept  is  m o s t  r e a d i l y  a p p l i c a b l e )  to  " i n d i r e c t "  
a c t i v i t i e s :  t h o s e  t h a t  bear  no immediate p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n  t o  
o u t p u t s .  
Th i s  paper  focuses  on p u b l i c ,  non-production,  n o t - f o r - p r o f i t  
and i n d i r e c t  a c t i v i t i e s  from a  p o i n t  of view of management con- 
t r o l :  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  exe rc i sed  by t h o s e  i n  charge ,  and t h e  t o o l s  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  them, t o  a s s u r e  t h a t  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  ob ta ined  and used 
e f f e c t i v e l y  and e f f i c i e n t l y  i n  the accomplishment o f  t h e  o rgan i -  
z a t i o n ' s  o b j e c t i v e s  . The paper  is  i n s p i r e d  by work done a t  two 
i n s t i t u t e s :  IIASA and t h e  European I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Advanced S t u d i e s  
i n  Management (EIASM), B r u s s e l s ,  Belgium. " S t r a t e g i c  mon i to r i ng  
of  p u b l i c  ' n o n - p r o f i t  making'  programs" is  one o f  t h e  themes 
i d e n t i f i e d  i n  IIASA'S 1979-83 Research P l a n  (Management and 
Technology Area, Task 3: I n t e r - O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  Problems, p .  1 2 3 ) .  
C a n t l e y  (1978,  1979) and Hervey (1978) have ,  w i t h i n  t h i s  theme, 
s t u d i e d  H e a l t h  Care  programs f o r  the e l d e r l y  i n  t h e  Uni ted  Kingdom. 
"Monitoring" is  d e f i n e d  as "the p r o c e s s  o f  i n fo rma t ion -ga the r i ng  
by which the o r g a n i z a t i o n  checks  b o t h  i ts  performance r e l a t i v e  
t o  t a r g e t s ,  and t h e  behav io r  o f  t h e  environment ,  a s sumpt ions  a b o u t  
which formed p a r t  of t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  p l a n  and the t a r g e t s "  
( C a n t l e y ,  1978:18).  ~ o n i t o r i n g  t h u s  is one e lement  i n  the pro-  
cess o f  management c o n t r o l  o f  such  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  
A t  EIASM, v a r i o u s  f a c u l t y  members and r e s e a r c h  s t u d e n t s  a t  
v a r i o u s  moments i n  t i m e  have been i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  
p u b l i c ,  n o t - f o r - p r o f i t  and i n d i r e c t  a c t i v i t i e s .  The p r e s e n t  
a u t h o r  p u b l i s h e d  a n  e a r l i e r  e s s a y  on  t h e  s u b j e c t  (Hofs tede ,  1978) . 
The r e l a t e d  i n t e r e s t s  a t  bo th  i n s t i t u t e s  l e d  t o  a  workshop b e i n g  
h e l d  i n  B r u s s e l s  i n  ~ p r i l  1979,  p r e p a r e d  and j o i n t l y  c h a i r e d  by 
Mark C a n t l e y  from IIASA, Anders Edstrdm from EIASM, and t h e  p re -  
s e n t  a u t h o r  who was a f f i l i a t e d  w i t h  b o t h  i n s t i t u t e s .  Twenty- 
e i g h t  p a r t i c i p a n t s  from e i g h t  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  p a r t i c i p a t e d  and a 
t o t a l  o f  twe lve  pape r s  w e r e  p r e s e n t e d .  The theme o f  t h e  workshop 
was d e f i n e d  a s  "Cont ro l  Systems and P r o c e s s e s  i n  P u b l i c  and Non- 
P r o f i t  O rgan i za t i ons "  . 
T h i s  paper  i s  a n  e s s a y  on t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  a r t  i n  t h e  f i e l d  
covered  by the workshop, i n s p i r e d  by i t s  pape r s  b u t  n o t  a t t e m p t i n g  
t o  summarize them. I s h a l l  approach the s u b j e c t  i n t e r d i s c i p l i n -  
a r i l y ,  b u t  w i t h  p a r t i c u l a r  stress on r e l e v a n t  i n p u t s  from t h e  
v a r i o u s  b e h a v i o r a l  s c i e n c e s ,  t r y i n g  t o  f i t  i n  w i t h  one o f  IIASA's 
other r e s e a r c h  o b j e c t i v e s  a s  w e l l :  "To r ev i ew  modern concep t s  o f  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  and management from a n  i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y ,  sys tems  
v iewpoin t"  (1979-83 ~ e s e a r c h  P l an ,  p .  120) . 
CLASSIFYING ACTIVITIES FROM A CONTROL VIEWPOINT 
The t i t l e  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  r u n s  "Management c o n t r o l  f o r  p u b l i c  
and n o t - f o r - p r o f i t l  a c t i v i t i e s "  r a t h e r  t h a n  " o r g a n i z a t i o n s " .  
From a management c o n t r o l  v iewpoin t ,  none o f  t h e  u s u a l  d i s t i n c -  
t i o n s  between p u b l i c 2 ,  p r i v a t e  and v o l u n t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  be- 
tween f o r - p r o f i t  and n o t - f ~ r - ~ r o f  i t 3 ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  o r  between 
p r o d u c t i on ,  s a l e s  and s e r v i c e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i s  very  mean ingfu l .  
W e  have to  go down t o  t h e  l e v e l  of  t y p e s  o f  a c t i v i t i e s ,  o f  which 
there may be s e v e r a l  w i t h i n  one o r g a n i z a t i o n .  
From a  management c o n t r o l  v iewpoin t ,  f o u r  c r i t e r i a  o f  a c t i v i -  
t ies have t o  b e  cons ide r eds :  
1. A r e  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  the a c t i v i t y  unambiguous o r  
ambiguous? 
2. A r e  i t s  o u t p u t s  measurable  o r  non-measurable? 
3.  A r e  e f f e c t s  of  management i n t e r v e n t i o n s  i n  it k n w n  
o r  unknown? 
4 .  Is t h e  a c t i v i t y  r e p e t i t i v e  o r  n o n - r e p e t i t i v e ?  
1. A r e  t h e  O b j e c t i v e s  Unambiguous o r  Ambiguous? 
Th i s  is t h e  most c r u c i a l  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  management c o n t r o l .  
Con t ro l  presupposes  a t a r g e t ;  what i f  t h e r e  is no clear t a r g e t ?  
There are s e v e r a l  r ea sons  why o b j e c t i v e s  may b e  ambiguous: 
(a) Because of c o n f l i c t s  o f  pe rce ived  i n t e r e s t s  and/or va lues  
among t h o s e  having a s a y  i n  t h e  a c t i v i t y .  For example, 
i n  running  a p r i s o n ,  t h e  d i r e c t o r  may be guided p r i m a r i l y  
by a d e s i r e  f o r  maximum s e c u r i t y  i n  p r o t e c t i n g  s o c i e t y ,  
t h e  p s y c h i a t r i c  s t a f f  by maximum o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  re- 
h a b i l i t a t i o n  of inmates ,  and t h e  h i g h e r  a u t h o r i t i e s  by 
minimal cost. Voluntary,  c h a r i t a b l e  or p r o f e s s i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  are f r e q u e n t l y  t h e  s cene  o f  v a l u e s  con- 
f l i c t s  ove r  o b j e c t i v e s .  The special i d e o l o g i c a l  commit- 
ment of t h e  members t o  such o r g a n i z a t i o n s  makes them 
assume t h e  r i g h t  and even t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  have t h e i r  
s a y  i n  o b j e c t i v e s ;  and one  member's views are l i k e l y  t o  
d i f f e r  from a n o t h e r ' s  (Selby,  1978) . 
(b) Because of  l a c k  of knowledge abou t  means-ends r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p s  i n  which the a c t i v i t y  cons ide red  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  
means. For example, t h e r e  may be agreement on  a h i g h e r  
l e v e l  o b j e c t i v e  such as "reduce unemployment" b u t  d i f -  
f e r e n t  b e l i e f s  about  whether the proposed a c t i v i t y  w i l l ,  
i n  f a c t ,  reduce unemployment, l e a v e  it una f fec t ed ,  o r  
i n c r e a s e  it. 
(c) Because of f a s t  changes i n  t h e  environment ("environ-  
mental  t u rbu lence" ,  see Emery and T r i s t ,  1969) which 
e n f o r c e  new o b j e c t i v e s  or make e x i s t i n g  o b j e c t i v e s  ob- 
solete, w i t h o u t  immediately sugges t ing  new ones .  For 
example, new l e g i s l a t i o n  t h a t  e n f o r c e s  a t a x  on po l lu -  
t i o n ;  new drugs  t h a t  comple te ly  change t h e  r o l e  o f  hos- 
p i t a l s  i n  t r e a t i n g  c e r t a i n  d i s e a s e s ;  t h e s e  c a l l  f o r  new 
o b j e c t i v e s  wh i l e  a t  t h e  same t i m e  many f o r c e s  w i t h i n  
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and w i t h i n  t h e i r  environments push 
f o r  a c o n t i n u a t i o n  of  t h e  o l d  o b j e c t i v e s .  
O b j e c t i v e s  a r e  unambiguous i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  consensus  o f  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  members, o r  when they  can  be imposed by a c e n t r a l  
a u t h o r i t y  o r  a dominant c o a l i t i o n .  
2. Are t h e  Outputs  Measurable o r  Non-Measurable? 
Management c o n t r o l  presupposes  t h a t  t h e  o u t p u t  of  an  a c t i v i t y  
c a n  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  and compared t o  t h e  t a r g e t s  t h a t  w e r e  set ,  and 
t h a t  t h i s  i n fo rma t ion  can be used t o  r e d i r e c t  e f f o r t s  w i t h i n  t h e  
a c t i v i t y  where neces sa ry .  " S t r a t e g i c  Moni tor ingn a s  d e f i n e d  on 
page 2 means looking  f o r  measures of o u t p u t s  ( i n  t h i s  ca se ,  
r e l a t i v e  t o  a  moving t a r g e t ) .  "Measurable" r e a l l y  means "quan t i -  
f  i a b l e "  , w i t h  a s  a  marginal  c a s e  o f  " q u a n t i f i c a t i o n "  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
whether a  planned e v e n t  d i d  o r  d i d  n o t  t a k e  p l a c e  ( a  1 o r  0 quan- 
t i f i c a t i o n ) .  However, many a c t i v i t i e s  bo th  i n  p r i v a t e  and i n  
p u b l i c  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  have o u t p u t s  t h a t  can on ly  be de f ined  i n  
q u a l i t a t i v e  and vague terms. How t o  q u a n t i f y  t h e  o u t p u t  o f  an  
army i n  t i m e s  o f  peace? Of a  p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s  department? Of 
many management and s t a f f  a c t i v i t i e s ?  Of a  m i n i s t r y  of educa t ion?  
I n  such c a s e s  only  t h e  i n p u t s  ( t h e  r e s o u r c e s  a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  
a c t i v i t y )  can  be  measured b u t  n o t  t h e  o u t p u t s .  
3. A r e  E f f e c t s  o f  Management I n t e r v e n t i o n s  Known o r  Unknown? 
E f f e c t i v e  management c o n t r o l  presupposes  t h a t  e f f o r t s  a l l o -  
c a t e d  t o  an a c t i v i t y  c a n  be r e d i r e c t e d  i f  t h e  outcome does  n o t  
m e e t  t h e  set t a r g e t s .  However, t h i s  imp l i e s  t h a t  t h e  manager 
knows how t o  i n t e r v e n e  i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  d e s i r e d  c o r r e c t i o n :  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between h i s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and t h e  r e a c t i o n  o f  
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  and between t h e  r e a c t i o n  of  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
and t h e  response  of  t h e  environment,  must be  c l e a r .  The " tech-  
nology" o f  t h e  a c t i v i t y  ( i n  t h e  w i d e s t  s ense )  must b e  unders tood.  
However, t h i s  i s  o f t e n  n o t  t h e  c a s e .  For example, one common 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  when outcomes a r e  judged u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  i s  t h e  re- 
placement of key personnel--say of a  p r o j e c t  manager. N o w  it is  
n o t  a t  a l l  c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h i s  w i l l  indeed c o r r e c t  t h e  d e v i a t i o n ,  
and even i f  outcomes improve a f t e r  t h e  personne l  change t h i s  may 
n o t  be  t h e  e f f e c t  of  t h a t  change; i t  could b e  a de layed  r e s u l t  
of  i n i t i a t i v e s  t aken  by t h e  p rev ious  p r o j e c t  manager, when t h e  
p roces s  has  a n a t u r a l  t i m e  la-g which h i g h e r  management d i d  n o t  
r ecogn ize .  Most p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  t aken  about  a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  
which t h e  technology is  a t  b e s t  on ly  p a r t l y  unders tood.  Educa- 
t i o n  i s  ano the r  f i e l d  of i l l - u n d e r s t o o d  technology: r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
between i n t e r v e n t i o n s  by e d u c a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  and t h e i r  ou t -  
comes on what i s  l e a rned  by s t u d e n t s  are a lmos t  never c l e a r .  
4 .  Is t h e  A c t i v i t y  R e p e t i t i v e  o r  Non-repe t i t ive?  
R e p e t i t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s - - t h o s e  t h a t  occur  d a i l y ,  weekly, a  few 
t i m e s  a  y e a r ,  once a  year--allow a  l e a r n i n g  e f f e c t  t o  t a k e  p l a c e  
which c o n s i d e r a b l y  f a c i l i t a t e s  c o n t r o l ,  Budgeting f o r  c u r r e n t  
o p e r a t i o n s  f o r  example, i s  a  r e p e t i t i v e  p roces s ,  Budget systems 
never  f u n c t i o n  w e l l  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  they  a r e  s t a r t e d ,  b u t  a f t e r  
f o u r  o r  f i v e  c y c l e s  they may s t a r t  t o  f u n c t i o n  w e l l ,  Non- 
r e p e t i t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  one-shot  programs, investments  o r  cam- 
pa igns .  Because t h e  a c t i v i t y  i n  i t s  p r e s e n t  form w i l l  n o t  come 
back, t h e r e  i s  no l e a r n i n g  e f f e c t :  a t  t h e  end of  t h e  program ,one 
may know how it should  have been done, b u t  t h i s  i s  of  l i t t l e  h e l p  
t o  anyone. 
A TYPOLOGY FOR MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
I t  w i l l  b e  immediately c l e a r  t h a t  management c o n t r o l  i s  
e a s i e s t  i f  t h e  f o u r  c r i t e r i a  mentioned on page 3 a l l  s a t i s f y  t h e  
f i r s t  a 1  t e r n a t i v e  mentioned: 
1. Objec t ives  are unambiguous. 
2.  Outputs  are measurable .  
3. E f f e c t s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  a r e  known. 
4 .  The a c t i v i t y  i s  r e p e t i t i v e .  
When one or  more o f  t h e  c r i t e r i a  does  n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  f i r s t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  mentioned on page 3, t h e  s i t u a t i o n  becomes more com- 
p l i c a t e d .  I n  F i g u r e  1, I have developed a typology i n  t h e  form 
of a d e c i s i o n  tree, which can be used t o  dete rmine  t h e  type  o f  
management c o n t r o l  l i k e l y  t o  occu r  i n  t h i s  case; s i x  types  o f  
management c o n t r o l  have been d i s t i n g u i s h e d :  
1. Routine C o n t r o l  
This  i s  t h e  easiest case j u s t  mentioned: unambiguous 
o b j e c t i v e s ,  measurable  o u t p u t s ,  known e f f e c t s  of i n t e r -  
v e n t i o n s ,  r e p e t i t i v e .  I t  a p p l i e s  t o  m o s t  c u r r e n t  opera- 
t i o n s  i n  p roduc t ion  and s e r v i c e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .    his 
t ype  o f  c o n t r o l  c a n  b e  p r e s c r i b e d  i n  p r e c i s e  r u l e s  and 
r e g u l a t i o n s ,  can  o f t e n  be  c a r r i e d  o u t  by o p e r a t i v e  per-  
sonne l  themselves ,  and s o m e t i m e s  programmed i n t o  a 
computer . 
2. Exper t  Con t ro l  
I f  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  unambiguous, o u t p u t s  measurable,  
e f f e c t s  of i n t e r v e n t i o n s  known bu t  t h e  a c t i v i t y  i s  n o t  
r e p e t i t i v e  ( such  as, a  one-shot  b u i l d i n g  p r o j e c t ,  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of new computer sys t em) ,  it makes s e n s e  
to e n t r u s t  c o n t r o l  to  someone f o r  whom such a c t i v i t i e s  
are r e p e t i t i v e ,  t h a t  i s ,  who has  been a b l e  to  l e a r n  
about  them on prev ious  occas5ons: such a person  is  an 
e x p e r t .  The obvious  danger of e x p e r t  c o n t r o l  i s  t h a t  
t h e  e x p e r t  does  n o t  u s e  t h e  knowledge of  e f f e c t s  of 
i n t e r v e n t i o n s  a l r e a d y  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n :  suc- 
c e s s f u l  e x p e r t  c o n t r o l  depends on ou r  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  
e x p e r t  knowledge w i t h  suppor t  from t h o s e  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  c u r r e n t  o p e r a t i o n s .  
3. Tria l -and-Error  Con t ro l  
I f  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  unambiguous, o u t p u t s  measurable,  b u t  
e f f e c t s  of i n t e r v e n t i o n s  n o t  known; hawever, t h e  a c t i v i t y  
is r e p e t i t i v e ,  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  can  l e a r n  t o  c o n t r o l  
through i t s  own f a i l u r e s .  Rigid  r u l e s  and p r e s c r i p t i o n s  
a r e  n o t  p o s s i b l e  b u t  a thorough ex-post  a n a l y s i s  of  bo th  
succes ses  and f a i l u r e s  i s  c a l l e d  f o r .  Examples a r e  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of new p roduc t s ,  s e r v i c e s  or t r ea tmen t s ;  
t h e  budget  c y c l e  f o r  c u r r e n t  o p e r a t i o n s .  
4. I n t u i t i v e  Con t ro l  
I f ,  i n  t h e  p rev ious  ca se ,  t h e  a c t i v i t y  is  n o t  r e p e t i t i v e ,  
l e a r n i n g  by t r i a l  and error canno t  t a k e  p lace .  I n  t h i s  
c a s e  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  has  to  r e l y  on management c o n t r o l  
as a n  a r t  r a t h e r  t han  as a  s c i e n c e ,  and f i n d  a  person 
or persons  who c a n  be  assumed to i n t u i t i v e l y  f i n d  t h e  
proper  i n t e r v e n t i o n  t o  ach ieve  t h e  d e s i r e d  r e s u l t s .  
a t i o n a l  
A c t i v i t y  
Rout ine  
C o n t r o l  
F i g u r e  1 .  A t y p o l o g y  f o r  management c o n t r o l .  
Thi s  w i l l  o f t e n  b e  a  type o f  c h a r i s m a t i c  l e a d e r .  
example i s  t h e  process  of l e a d i n g  a  demoralized f 
c l u b  o r  e n t e r p r i s e  back t o  succes s  ( i n  t h e s e  case  
l e a d e r  is  u s u a l l y  given no t i m e  f o r  t r i a l - and -e r r  
cyc les ! )  . A s p e c i a l  case of  i n t u i t i v e  c o n t r o l  i s  
p rocess  by which r e sou rces  a r e  o b t a i n e d  f o r  new a 
t ies .  I n  l a r g e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t h i s  is u s u a l l y  t 
proposa ls  developed a t  lower l e v e l s  which t h e n  w i  
approved o r  r e f u s e d  by h ighe r  l e v e l s .  Each propo: 
a n o n - r e p e t i t i v e  a c t i v i t y ;  g e t t i n g  it accepted  i s  
cess i n  which e f f e c t s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  are unprec 
Bower (1970) ,  a f t e r  an  e x t e n s i v e  s tudy  o f  t h e  r e s  
a l l o c a t i o n  p roces s  i n  a l a r g e  US b u s i n e s s  f i rm,  r 
mends a system of  reviews by h i g h e r  management i r  
c e s s i v e  phases  of t h e  development o f  p r o p o s a l s .  
f a c t ,  he recommends t o  make t h e  a c t i v i t y  r e p e t i t ;  
t h a t  ( i n  my terminology) i n t u i t i v e  c o n t r o l  by thc 
t r y  t o  g e t  a  proposal  accep ted  i s  r ep l aced  by tr: 
e r r o r  c o n t r o l .  
5. Judgmental  Con t ro l  
W e  now have t h e  case t h a t ,  a l though  o b j e c t i v e s  a r  
ambiguous, o u t p u t s  are n o t  measurable .  The f i r s t  
t i o n  t o  be  asked is ,  whether any i n d i r e c t  measure= - 
o u t p u t s  can  be  found which can  be  cons ide red  acce 
" s u r r o g a t e s "  o r  "proxies"  f o r  t h e  m i s s i n  d i r e c t  ? s u r e s  (Anthony and Herz l inge r ,  1975:141) . For c 
a t  t h e  EIASM-IIASA workshop, Hulshof (1979) repor 
c o n t r o l  i n  a Dutch s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  
non-measurable o u t p u t  i s  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  of t h e  
z a t i o n  t o  t h e  wel l -being of  t h e  e n t i r e  t a r g e t  po; 
t i o n .  F e a s i b l e  i n d i r e c t  measures a r e  t h e  number 
c l i e n t s  s e rved  and t h e  average t i m e  s p e n t  p e r  cl: 
This  is  on ly  meaningful ,  however, i f  c l i e n t s  can 
d iv ided  i n t o  c a t e g o r i e s  according t o  t h e  t i m e  nec 
reach  a  p r o f e s s i o n a l l y  accep tab le  l e v e l  of h e l p .  
s u r r o g a t e  measures can  b e  found t h a t  make s e n s e  a 
a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  p a r t i e s  involved ,  t h e  c o n t r o l  p - -  
has  become similar t o  t h e  c a s e  of  measurable out1 
I f  no i n d i r e c t  measures a r e  a v a i l a b l e ,  c o n t r o l  of 
a c t i v i t y  becomes a  ma t t e r  of  s u b j e c t i v e  judgment; 
have c a l l e d  i t  judgmental c o n t r o l .  I t  depends G: 
power and i n f l u e n c e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  o rgan iza t io :  
whether t h e r e  i s  one supreme judge ( o r  c o a l i t i o n  
judges) whose judgment i s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  i n t e r v e n t  
whether judgments have t o  b e  n e g o t i a t e d  be fo re  i r  
v e n t i o n  becomes p o s s i b l e ,  o r  whether no judgment 
p o s s i b l e  s o  t h a t  c o n t r o l  happens on ly  by acc iden t  
n o t  a t  a l l .  
6 .  P o l i t i c a l  Cont ro l  
From a c o n t r o l  p o i n t  of view, t h e  most d i f f i c u l t  c.... 
i s  when o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  ambiguous. On page 3, I s. 
g e s t e d  t h r e e  reasons  f o r  such ambiguity:  (1) conf 
o f  perce ived  i n t e r e s t s  and/or va lues ;  ( 2 )  l a c k  of 
knowledge abou t  means-ends r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  and ( 3) env i -  
ronmenta l  t u r b u l e n c e .  O r g a n i z a t i o n s  have  ways, however, 
t o  r e s o l v e  a m b i g u i t i e s  s o  t h a t  e x t e r n a l  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
become i n t e r n a l  c e r t a i n t i e s  and t h e  c o n t r o l  p roce s s  can  
proceed i n  one o f  t h e  ways d e s c r i b e d  above.  A f i r s t  
way t o  r e s o l v e  a m b i g u i t i e s  i s  t h e  u s e  o f  h i e r a r c h y :  
h i g h e r  a u t h o r i t i e s  o r  b u r e a u c r a c i e s  se t  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  
which t h e n  f o r  t h o s e  lower i n  t h e  h i e r a r c h y  have become 
unambiguous. A second way is  t h e  u s e  o f  r u l e s  and 
f i x e d  p o l i c i e s ;  t h e s e  r e p r e s e n t  b a s i c a l l y  a r b i t r a r y  
c h o i c e s  b u t  t h e y  c r e a t e  a  quasi-unambiguous s e t t i n g .  
A t h i r d  way, u sed  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  where c o n f l i c t s  o f  per-  
c e i v e d  i n t e r e s t s  and/or  v a l u e s  are concerned,  i s  nego- 
t i a t i o n ;  t h e  n e g o t i a t e d  s e t t l e m e n t  becomes t h e  unambig- 
uous o b j e c t i v e .  A f o u r t h  way i s  t h e  u s e  of  e x p e r t s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i n  cases of l a c k  o f  knowledge abou t  means- 
ends  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The c r u c i a l  f a c t o r  i n  t h i s  case is  
t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  of  t h e  e x p e r t  by t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  man- 
a g e r s :  n o t  whether  he  r e a l l y  knows, b u t  whether  h e  is  
c r e d i b l e  t o  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a s  someone who c a n  r e s o l v e  
ambigu i ty .  A f i f t h  way i s  c o n t r o l  by crisis: l e t t i n g  
a crisis s i t u a t i o n  deve lop  i n  which t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
comes under e x c e p t i o n a l  stress. S t r e s s  t e n d s  t o  reduce  
t h e  number o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  s o l u t i o n s  which peop le  can 
p e r c e i v e ;  t h i s  r e d u c t i o n  o f  p e r c e i v e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s  may 
make a n  ambiguous s i t u a t i o n  look unambiguous. Thus, 
t h e  1973-74 o i l  crisis i n  t h e  USA f o r c e d  a d e c i s i o n  
abou t  t h e  A la ska  o i l  p r o j e c t  which had been de l ayed  be- 
c ause  o f  t h e  c o n f l i c t  between env i ronmen ta l  c o n s e r v a t i o n  
and energy  demand o b j e c t i v e s  ( S l o v i c ,  1978: 109) . When 
a m b i g u i t i e s  i n  o b j e c t i v e s  e x i s t ,  c o n t r o l  i s  always  
pol i t i ca l  c o n t r o l ,  dependent  on power s t r u c t u r e s ,  nego- 
t i a t i o n  p r o c e s s e s ,  t h e  need f o r  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t s  and c o n f l i c t i n g  
v a l u e s ;  however, p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  a t  t h e  t o p  o f  a n  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  c a n  go t o g e t h e r  w i t h  o t h e r  forms o f  c o n t r o l  
i n s i d e  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  f o r  t h e  members, t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  t o p  may have r e s o l v e d  t h e  a m b i g u i t i e s .  
The model of  F i g u r e  1 a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  t y p e s  of  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  whether  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  b e  p r i v a t e ,  p u b l i c ,  f o r -  
p r o f i t  o r  n o t - f o r - p r o f i t .  I t  a l s o  a p p l i e s  t o  a c t i v i t i e s  a t  a l l  
h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l s ,  a l t hough  t h e r e  is  a tendency f o r  c o n t r o l  
Types 1 and 2 t o  occur  a t  t h e  lower and c o n t r o l  Types 5  and 6  
a t  t h e  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  w i t h  3 and 4  i n  between.  
Anthony (1965) has  d e f i n e d  a  framework f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  p lan-  
n i n g  and c o n t r o l  sy s t ems  i n  g e n e r a l ,  i n  which "management c o n t r o l "  
i s  o n l y  t h e  second o f  t h r e e  t y p e s  which are r e l a t e d  t o  l e v e l s  i n  
t h e  h i e r a r c h y  : 
1. S t r a t e g i c  p l ann ing :  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e c i d i n g  on ob j ec -  
t i v e s  of  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  on  changes  i n  t h o s e  ob j ec -  
t i v e s ,  on  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  used t o  a t t a i n  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  
and on t h e  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  a r e  t o  govern  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  
u se ,  and d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e s e  r e s o u r c e s .  
2. Management c o n t r o l :  see t he  d e f i n i t i o n  on page 1. 
3. Opera t iona l  c o n t r o l :  t h e  process  of a s s u r i n g  t h a t  spe- 
c i f i c  t a s k s  a r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  e f f e c t i v e l y  and e f f i c i e n t l y .  
The typology of F i g u r e  1 i n c l u d e s  a l l  t h r e e  of  Anthony's 
t y p e s .  However, most of " s t r a t e g i c  planning" be longs  p e r  d e f i n i -  
t i o n  t o  c o n t r o l  Type 6: p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l .  P o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  is  
r a r e l y  d i scussed  i n  management c o n t r o l  theory :  it i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  
t h a t  it i s  much more u s u a l  to  speak of  " s t r a t e g i c  planning" than  
of  " s t r a t e g i c  c o n t r o l "  .7 Most of " o p e r a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l n  belongs 
t o  c o n t r o l  Type 1 : r o u t i n e  c o n t r o l .  Only Anthony 's "management 
c o n t r o l "  may belong t o  a l l  s i x  types  i n  F igure  1. 
The typology of F i g u r e  1 need no t  be l i m i t e d  to  a c t i v i t i e s  
t a k i n g  p l ace  w i t h i n  one s i n g l e  o rgan iza t ion ;  it c a n  b e  app l i ed  
t o  a c t i v i t i e s  i n v o l v i n g  s e v e r a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  ( " i n t e r -  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  networks") . However, t h e r e  w i l l  b e  a tendency 
i n  such a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  c o n t r o l  t o  be  mostly of Types 6  and 5: 
p o l i t i c a l  and judgmental .8 
CYBERNETIC MODELS OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
The dominant model f o r  a c o n t r o l  p rocess  is  t h e  f i r s t - o r d e r  
nega t ive  feedback loop;  t h e  dominant analogy is  a the rmos ta t .  
O b j e c t i v e  s e t t i n g  is  analogous t o  t h e  s e t t i n g  of  t h e  temperature ,  
measuring ou tpu t  t o  measuring a c t u a l  temperature ,  comparing ou t -  
p u t  t o  o b j e c t i v e s  is  ana logous  t o  comparing a c t u a l  t o  set t e m -  
p e r a t u r e ,  feed ing  back unwanted va r i ances  t o  management is  ana l -  
ogous to  t h e  nega t ive  feezback s i g n a l  i n  t h e  t he rmos ta t  c y c l e ,  
c o r r e c t i v e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  process  is  analogous t o  i n t e r v e n -  
t i o n  i n  t h e  flow of  h e a t  t o  t h e  system. P o s s i b l e  e x t e n s i o n s  of 
t h i s  model are: (1) the a d d i t i o n  of  a  feed-forward loop  us ing  
e x t e r n a l  in format ion  f o r  a  f i r s t  a n t i c i p a t o r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  
t h e  p roces s  (Cant ley,  1978: 28) . I t  should always be followed 
up by a feedback loop; ( 2 )  t h e  a d d i t i o n  of second- and h igher -  
order feedback loops  that  c o n t r o l  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  s e t t i n g  o f  t he  
lower-order feedback loops ,  and poss ib ly  may o v e r r u l e  t h e  i n t e r -  
v e n t i o n s  of t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  l o o p  (Hofs tede,  1967:lOO). A 1 1  
t h e s e  a r e  c y b e r n e t i c  models (Hofstede,  1978) . 
N o w  t h e  c y b e r n e t i c  model r e a l l y  only  a p p l i e s  f u l l y  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  r o u t i n e  c o n t r o l :  Type 1 i n  F igure  1. I t  a p p l i e s  margin- 
a l l y  t o  Type 2  ( e x p e r t  c o n t r o l )  and Type 3 ( t r i a l - a n d - e r r o r  con- 
t r o l ) :  t o  Type 2  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t he  "expe r t "  i s  supposed t o  
have become e x p e r t  th rough  feedback from prev ious  exper ience ;  t o  
Type 3 i f  w e  a c c e p t  tha t  the model i n c l u d e s  h e u r i s t i c  e lements .  
I t  d e f i n i t e l y  does  n o t  app ly  when o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  ambiguous (Type 
6 ) ,  o u t p u t s  n o t  measurable  (Type 5) o r  e f f e c t s  of a  one-shot 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  unknown (Type 4 )  . 
Pure Type 1, r o u t i n e  c o n t r o l  can be  h i g h l y  formal ized ,  some- 
t i m e s  even q u a n t i f i e d  and computerized.  However, even r o u t i n e  
c o n t r o l  p rocesses  u s u a l l y  i nvo lve  communication between and 
mot iva t ion  of people  which means they c o n t a i n  a psycho log ica l  
e lement  (Hofs tede,  1976; Flamhol tz ,  1979) .  W e  can s a y  t h a t  a s  
soon a s  peop le  a r e  p a r t  of  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  e f f e c t s  of i n t e r v e n t i o n s  
a r e  no l onge r  comp le t e ly  known; i n  F i g u r e  1, o u r  r o u t i n e  c o n t r o l  
r a t h e r  becomes t r i a l - a n d - e r r o r  c o n t r o l :  l e a r n i n g  abou t  human be- 
h a v i o r  t a k e s  ve ry  much p l a c e  through t r i a l  and e r r o r .  The cyber-  
n e t i c  model now becomes compl i ca t ed  by p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s h o r t -  
c i r c u i t i n g .  I n  a n  e a r l i e r ,  e m p i r i c a l  s t u d y  of budge t i ng  p r o c e s s e s  
( H o f s t e d e ,  1967:96) I have shown fou r  such p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s h o r t -  
c i r c u i t i n g  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :  (1) people  change t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  r a t h e r  
t h a n  t h e  p r o c e s s  i t s e l f ;  ( 2 )  peop le  change t h e  measurements r a t h e r  
t h a n  t h e  p r o c e s s  i t s e l f ;  ( 3 )  peop le  make t h e  i n t e n d e d  i n t e r v e n -  
t i o n s  b u t  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e y  make some un in tended  i n t e r v e n -  
t i o n s  a s  w e l l  ( such  a s ,  t hey  a d j u s t  c o s t  a t  t h e  expense  o f  qua l -  
i t y )  ; ( 4 )  people  wi thdraw from t h e  sys tem by absen t ee i sm  ( t h i s  
means s t r i k i n g  i n d i v i d u a l l y )  , s t r i k i n g  c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  o r  q u i t t i n g .  
From t h e s e ,  1, 2 and 3  a r e  p sycho log i ca l  s h o r t - c i r c u i t s  th rough  
which c o n t r o l  changes  i n t o  pseudo-con t ro l :  t h i s  is  a  s t a t e  i n  
which t h e  c o n t r o l  sys tem shows a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h o u t  t h e  p r o c e s s  
a c t u a l l y  be ing  c o n t k o l l e d  . 
- 
The more fo rma l i zed  a  c o n t r o l  sys tem,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  r i s k  
o f  o b t a i n i n g  pseudo-con t ro l  r a t h e r  t han  c o n t r o l ;  a t  l e a s t  a s  l ong  
a s  t h e r e  a r e  peop le  l e f t  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  whose e f f e c t  code te rmines  
t h e  outcomes.  S o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  pseudo-con t ro l  problem a r e  psycho- 
l o g i c a l :  a v o i d i n g  p r o c e s s e s  and i n t e r v e n t i o n s  t h a t  reward e s c a p e s  
i n t o  pseudo-con t ro l  (Todd, 1 9 7 7 ) .  One o f  t h e  m o s t  promis ing  ways 
f o r  a v o i d i n g  pseudo-con t ro l  i s  moving c o n t r o l  downward t o  t h e  
l e v e l  of t h o s e  who a c t u a l l y  i n t e r v e n e  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  i s  
c o n t r a r y  t o  F.W. T a y l o r ' s  p r i n c i p l e  of  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  of  c o n t r o l  
and e x e c u t i o n .  I t  r e p l a c e s  e x t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  by s e l f - c o n t r o l ,  i n  
which t h e  whole c y b e r n e t i c  c y c l e  of measur ing,  comparing t o  s t a n -  
d a r d ,  f e e d i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  back,  and i n t e r v e n i n g  i s  i n  t h e  hands 
o f  t h e  same person  o r  work group.  T h i s  c o n t r o l  c y c l e  i s  l i n k e d  
to  t h e  s u r round ing  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o n l y  through t h e  s t a n d a r d s  t h a t  
a r e  set .  W e  can  c a l l  such  a  p r o c e s s  "homeos t a t i c "  r a t h e r  t han  
" c y b e r n e t i c " ;  i t s  ana logy  i s  n o t  a  t h e r m o s t a t  b u t  a  b i o l o g i c a l  
e l e m e n t  r e p r e s e n t e d  by a  l i v i n g  c e l l .  The ce l l  i s  equipped w i t h  
i n t e r n a l  p r o c e s s e s  c a p a b l e  of  ma in t a in ing  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  a  
changing environment ,  p rov ided  t h a t  env i ronmenta l  c o n d i t i o n s  d o  
n o t  become t o o  u n f a v o r a b l e  (Hofs tede ,  1978; den  Her tog,  1978) . 
Avoiding pseudo-con t ro l  th rough  s e l f - c o n t r o l  c an  b e  s e e n  a s  an  
a p p l i c a t i o n  of Ashby 's Law of R e q u i s i t e  V a r i e t y  (Ashby, 1956 :Ch . 
11). A s  a  major  s o u r c e  of  v a r i e t y  i n  t h e  outcomes i s  i n  t h e  
p e o p l e  who e x e c u t e  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  on ly  t h e s e  p e o p l e  themse lves  
p o s s e s s  t h e  c o n t r o l  v a r i e t y  t h a t  c a n  r e g u l a t e  t h e  p r o c e s s .  
The c y b e r n e t i c  model o f  management c o n t r o l  i s  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e  
o f  t h e  "Cyc le  o f  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  Choice" a s  p i c t u r e d  by March and 
Olsen ( 1 976 ) .  T h i s  i s  reproduced  i n  F i g u r e  2.  
I f  w e  app ly  t h e  model o f  F igu re  2 t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  s i t u a t i o n ,  
t h e  o b j e c t i v e  or s t a n d a r d  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by box A ,  p e o p l e ' s  pre-  
f e r e n c e s  or "models of  t h e  w o r l d n .  I n  c o n t r o l  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e s e  
p r e f e r e n c e s  t end  t o  b e  c o n t r o l l e d  by a  h i g h e r - o r d e r  c i r c u i t  ( t h e  
s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  p r o c e s s ) .  Arrow a  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  measurement 
p r o c e s s .  I n  box A ,  measures  a r e  a l s o  checked a g a i n s t  p r e f e r e n c e s .  
A r r o w  b  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  feedback s i g n a l .  Box B i s  i t s  r e c e p t i o n  
Figure  2 .  The complete c y c l e  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  cho ice .  
(from: March and Olsen,  1976:13) 
and t r a n s l a t i o n  by i n d i v i d u a l  a c t o r s .  Arrow c is  t h e  i n t e r v e n -  
t i o n  i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p roces s ;  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by 
box C .  Arrow d r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  technology of  t h e  p roces s ,  box D 
i t s  t r a n s l a t i o n  i n t o  o u t p u t s .  
A I n d i v i d u a l s  ' cogni-  
t i o n s  and p r e f e r -  
ences ,  t h e i r  "models 
o f  t h e  world" 
I n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n s  
o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
a  cho ice  s i t u a t i o n  
NON-CYBERNETIC "MODELS " 
b 
I n  t h e  previous  s e c t i o n  I l i m i t e d  t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of  t h e  
c y b e r n e t i c  model t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  Types 1, 2 and 3  i n  F igu re  1. 
However, t h e  c y b e r n e t i c  model i s  s o  a t t r a c t i v e  t h a t  it i s  f r e -  
q u e n t l y  used beyond i t s  zone of  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  , because t h e  assump- 
t i o n s  t h a t  have one i n  it a r e  no t  r e a l i z e d  (Anthony, 1965: 87; 
Hofs tede,  1978) . g 
h 
Two t y p e s  of a l t e r n a t i v e  "models" are a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  con- 
t r o l  Types 4 and e s p e c i a l l y  5  and 6  i n  Figure  1: p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  
and "garbage-can" c o n t r o l .  (The word "model" does  n o t  mean, how- 
eve r  t h a t  t h e s e  types  of c o n t r o l  can b e  e a s i l y  r e p r e s e n t e d  by a 
diagram wi th  boxes and arrows.) The pure  c y b e r n e t i c  model assumes 
r a t i o n a l i t y  of t h e  e n t i r e  system.  For Anthony (196 5  :93) , t h e  
s o u r c e  d i s c i p l i n e s  o f  r o u t i n e  c o n t r o l  (which he cal ls  " o p e r a t i o n a l  
c o n t r o l " )  a r e  economics and t h e  p h y s i c a l  s c i e n c e s .  I f  w e  admit  
p sycho log ica l  e lements  i n  t h e  system (Type 3  c o n t r o l )  t h e  system 
i s  no longer  f u l l y  r a t i o n a l ;  f o r  Anthony, t h e  s o u r c e  d i s c i p l i n e  
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a c t i o n s  - o r  
" r e sponses"  
The p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  model assumes t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  
a c t o r s  i n  t h e  sys tem who e a c h  a c t  s u b j e c t i v e l y  r a t i o n a l l y :  t h e y  
a c t  i n  t h e i r  own p e r c e i v e d  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  b u t  t h e  c o n s o l i d a t e d  
r e s u l t  o f  t h e i r  a c t i o n s  d o e s  n o t  r e p r e s e n t  a  r a t i o n a l  t o t a l  s y s -  
t e m .  However, t h e  b e h a v i o r  of  t h e  a c t o r s  c o u l d  p o s s i b l y  be  p r e -  
d i c t e d  by such a  t h i n g  a s  Game Theory .  W e  f i n d  e l e m e n t s  of such  
a  p o l i t i c a l  model, i m p l i c i t l y  r a t h e r  t h a n  e x p l i c i t l y ,  i n  f o r  
example C r o z i e r ' s  (1964:117) d e s c r i p t i o n  of p o w e r  games i n  t h e  
French t o b a c c o  monopoly, and Anthony and H e r z l i n g e r ' s  (1975: 249f f )  
d e s c r i p t i o n  of t w e n t y - e i g h t  " p l o y s "  t o  b e  used i n  budge t  n e g o t i -  
a t i o n s ,  and how t o  c o u n t e r  them. 
The "garbage-can model" i s  p u t  forward i n  March and Olsen  
( 1 9 7 6 ) .  They s i g n a l  t h a t  t h e  " c y c l e  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c h o i c e "  
( F i g u r e  2) , which w e  c a n  a l s o  c o n s i d e r  a s  a  more g e n e r a l  form o f  
t h e  c y b e r n e t i c  model,  o f t e n  d o e s  n o t  f u n c t i o n .  Each of t h e  ar rows 
i n  t h e  model c a n  i n  p r a c t i c e  b e  i n t e r r u p t e d  ( o p .  c i t . :  56-59) . 
I f  a r row a  i s  i n t e r r u p t e d  ( F i g u r e  2 ) ,  t h i s  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  o u r  
c a s e  o f  immeasurable o u t p u t s  ( F i g u r e  1) . I f  a r row c and/or  d  a r e  
i n t e r r u p t e d ,  t h i s  c o r r e s p o n d s  to  a  c a s e  o f  unknown e f f e c t s  o f  
i n t e r v e n t i o n s .  I f  a r row b  i s  i n t e r r u p t e d ,  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n  i s  
n o t  a f f e c t e d  by knowledge coming th rough  t h e  sys tem,  i n d i v i d u a l s  
d o  n o t  r e a c t  t o  t h e  feedback s i g n a l s  r e c e i v e d ,  f o r  example be- 
c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  c o m p l e t e l y  c a u g h t  i n  s t a n d a r d  o p e r a t i n g  p roce -  
d u r e s  . l o  
March and O l s e n  s u g g e s t  f o r  s u c h  c a s e s  a  "garbage-can model 
o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c h o i c e "  ( b a s e d  upon e a r l i e r  work w i t h  M.D. 
Cohen) . T h i s  model a p p l i e s  t o  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which 
no assumpt ions  a r e  made a b o u t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  h i e r a r c h i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e s  o r  g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t e d  r u l e s ;  t h e  a u t h o r s  c a l l  them 
" o r g a n i z e d  a n a r c h i e s "  . O b j e c t i v e s  may b e  ambiguous, o u t p u t s  non- 
m e a s u r a b l e ,  e f f e c t s  of  i n t e r v e n t i o n ~  n o t  known, a c t i v i t i e s  non- 
r e p e t i t i v e .  Even the p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  c h o i c e s  may n o t  b e  
known i n  advance ,  and a c t u a l l y  wander i n  and o u t .  The a u t h o r s  
i l l u s t r a t e  t h e i r  model w i t h  d a t a  from e d u c a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
( s c h o o l s  and u n i v e r s i t i e s )  i n  t h e  USA and S c a n d i n a v i a .  I n  t h e  
"garbage-can"  p r o c e s s ,  a l l  i s s u e s  t h a t  c o n f r o n t  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
a t  a  g i v e n  t i m e  a r e  p u t  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  i n  a  "ga rbage  c a n " ,  which  
poses a  l i m i t  t o  t h e  amount of  a t t e n t i o n  a v a i l a b l e .  There a r e  
more o r  less i n d e p e n d e n t  f lows  of problems,  s o l u t i o n s ,  p a r t i c i -  
p a n t s  and c h o i c e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n  and o u t  of t h e  ga rbage  c a n ,  
and c h o i c e s  a r e  n o t  o n l y  made by r e s o l v i n g  problems b u t  a l s o  by 
o v e r l o o k i n g  them o r  d e l i b e r a t e l y  e s c a p i n g  from them. T h i s  pro-  
cess i s  n o n - r a t i o n a l .  I t  i s  n o t  r a t i o n a l  a t  t h e  sys tems  l e v e l ,  
n o r  i s  it  r a t i o n a l  a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l ,  b e c a u s e  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  
i s  ambiguous: peop le  o f t e n  d o  n o t  know what  t h e y  want .  The one  
l e a d i n g  p r i n c i p l e  o f  a c t i o n  i n  ambiguous s i t u a t i o n s  i s  t h a t  i n -  
d i v i d u a l s  look f o r  c o g n i t i v e  c o n s i s t e n c y :  t h e y  t r y  t o  have  models 
o f  t h e  wor ld  t h a t  t o  them make some s e n s e .  I n  o r d e r  t o  m a i n t a i n  
these t h e y  a r e  a b l e  t o  d o  n o n - r a t i o n a l  t h i n g s :  t o  f o r g e t ,  t o  o v e r -  
l o o k ,  t o  p l a y .  11 
A key e lement  i n  b o t h  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and t h e  garbage-can 
model a r e  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  a c t o r s .  Values a r e  b road  p r e f e r e n c e s  
f o r  o n e  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  o v e r  o t h e r s  which a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  stable 
over  t i m e .  I n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  model, v a l u e s  determine how t h e  a c t o r s  
perce ive  t h e i r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t :  i f  w e  know t h e i r  s t a b l e  va lues ,  we 
can come c l o s e r  t o  p r e d i c t i n g  t h e i r  behav io r .  I n  t h e  garbage can 
model, v a l u e s  a r e  t h e  e lements  of t he  a c t o r s '  "models of t h e  
world" and they determine what s t a t e  of  a f f a i r s  t o  them w i l l  be 
c o g n i t i v e l y  c o n s i s t e n t .  
This  means t h a t  i f  w e  want t o  a n a l y s e  o r  improve c o n t r o l  of  
t h e  Types 5 and 6  i n  F igu re  1 ( judgmental  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l )  , 
w e  should i n c l u d e  t h e  s tudy  of va lues  i n  o u r  program.12 Judg- 
mental  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  a r e  t h e  e lements  t h a t  go i n t o  p o l i c y  
d e c i s i o n s .  Without t h e  s tudy  of va lues ,  pol+cy r e a l l y  corresponds 
t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  which S t r i n g e r  (1976:23) cites from t h e  Oxford 
E n g l i s h  d i c t i o n a r y  " a  form of gambling i n  which bets a r e  made on 
numbers t o  be drawn i n  a  l o t t e r y " .  I f  w e  want t o  make better bets, 
w e  have to s tudy  v a l u e s .  Values are non-ra t iona l :  they preceed 
t h e  u s e  of  r a t i o n a l i t y .  
The garbage can m o d e l ,  a s  opposed t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  model, 
a l s o  has  room f o r  r i t u a l s .  R i t u a l s  are a c t i v i t i e s  performed be- 
c a u s e  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  meaning they c a r r y  f o r  t h o s e  performing 
them. They a r e  symbolic a c t i v i t i e s ,  e s s e n t i a l  e lements  i n  t h e  
c o g n i t i v e  cons i s t ency  which t h e  garbage can  model assumes people  
t r y  t o  main ta in .  They a r e  s t r e s s - r e l i e v i n g .  W e  t e n d  t o  a c c e p t  
d e f i n i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  a s  r i t u a l s  i n  r e l i g i o u s  ceremonies ,  pos s ib ly  
even i n  s o c i a l  ceremonies,  b u t  the r i t u a l  element i n  work, bus i -  
ne s s  and government i s  r a r e l y  recognized.  When t h e  word " r i t u a l "  
is  a p p l i e d  t o  work a c t i v i t i e s ,  it t ends  t o  c a r r y  t h e  connota t ion  
of  " u s e l e s s  and i n e f f e c t i v e " .  I n  f a c t ,  r i t u a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  even 
a t  work, are n e i t h e r  u s e l e s s  nor i n e f f e c t i v e ;  t hey  a r e  necessary  
and inescapab le  because  w e  a l l  have o u r  need f o r  c o g n i t i v e  con- 
s i s t e n c y .  But t h e r e  are good r i t u a l s  and bad r i t u a l s .  Examples 
of r i t u a l  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  work o r g a n i z a t i o n s  are given  i n  Hofstede 
(1977:42f f ) ;  mee t ings ,  m e m o s  and r e p o r t s ,  p a r t s  of account ing  
systems,  rts of p l ann ing  and c o n t r o l  sys tems ,  o f t e n  t h e  u se  o f  
e x p e r t s  . IF 
Values and r i t u a l s  are c o l l e c t i v e  phenomena: t h e y  a r e  p a r t  
of t h e  c u l t u r e  of human groups.  My own s h o r t  d e f i n i t i o n  of  "cul-  
t u r e "  i s  " t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  programming o f  t h e  mind t h a t  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  
t h e  members of  one human group from a n o t h e r " .  Cu l tu re  e x i s t s  a t  
v a r i o u s  l e v e l s :  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  ( a l s o  c a l l e d  " n a t i o n a l  char -  
acter") , a t  t h e  r e g i o n a l ,  occupa t iona l ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ,  s o c i a l  
class, male/female, age  group, and f ami ly  l e v e l s .  I have chosen 
t o  reserve t h e  word " c u l t u r e "  f o r  n a t i o n a l  p a t t e r n s  of  mental 
programming and " subcu l tu re"  f o r  a l l  t h e  o t h e r  l e v e l s .  A s  c u l t u r e s  
and s u b c u l t u r e s  i nvo lve  systems of commonly he ld  v a l u e s  and com- 
monly p r a c t i s e d  r i t u a l s ,  c u l t u r e  is an  e s s e n t i a l  e lement  i n  Type 
5 and Type 6  c o n t r o l  ( F i g u r e  1): judgmental and p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l .  
I n  a n  e x t e n s i v e  s t u d y  of n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r e s  i n  f o r t y  c o u n t r i e s  
(e .g . ,  Hofstede,  1979) ,  I found f o u r  dimensions of n a t i o n a l  cu l -  
t u r e  a long  which t h e  f o r t y  country  c u l t u r e s  d i f f e r .  I l a b e l l e d  
them Power Dis tance ,  Unce r t a in ty  Avoidance, Ind iv idua l i sm-  
C o l l e c t i v i s m ,  and Mascul in i  ty-Feminini t y  . Now the one dimens i o n  
most r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  of judgmental and p o l i t i c a l  
c o n t r o l  p r o c e s s e s  i n  a  c o u n t r y  i s  U n c e r t a i n t y  Avoidance (Bof s t ede ,  
1 9 7 7 ) .  S o c i e t i e s  d i f f e r  i n  their member's modal l e v e l  of t o l e r -  
a n c e  f o r  u n c e r t a i n t y  a b o u t  t h e  f u t u r e .  A lower l e v e l  of t o l e r a n c e  
f o r  u n c e r t a i n t y  l e a d s  to  a  h i g h e r  modal l e v e l  o f  a n x i e t y  (which 
c a n  be demons t ra ted  i n  medica l  symptoms). Higher  a n x i e t y  l e v e l s  
l e a d  t o  a  g r e a t e r  need f o r  a n x i e t y - r e l i e v i n g ,  u n c e r t a i n t y  avo id ing  
r i t u a l s .  I n  t h e  f i e l d s  of  judgmental  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l ,  t h i s  
l e a d s  t o  t h e  a c c e p t a n c e  of  more s t r i c t l y  f o rma l i zed  p rocedu re s ,  a  
need f o r  f o rma l  r u l e s  r a t h e r  t han  u n s t r u c t u r e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s  . I4  
T h a t  is,  judgmental  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  t a k e  d i f f e r e n t  forms i n  
d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s  and t h i s  shou ld  b e  s o ,  f o r  t h e  deep-seated  
r i t u a l  needs  t o  which t h e s e  p r o c e s s e s  c a t e r  a r e  n o t  t h e  same'  
- 
a c r o s s  c o u n t r i e s .  There  a r e  no u n i v e r s a l l y  op t ima l  p rocedures  
f o r  judgmenta l  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l ,  w h i l e  t h e r e  a r e  ve ry  l i k e l y  
u n i v e r s a l l y  o p t i m a l  p rocedu re s  f o r  r o u t i n e  c o n t r o l .  
Next  t o  n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r e s ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s u b c u l t u r e s  p l ay  
a  r o l e  i n  shap ing  p rocedu re s  f o r  judgmenta l  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l .  
For example,  D e r l i e n  (1978a) draws a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  s u b c u l t u r e  
o f  s e c r e t i v e n e s s  i n  p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  Germany. I gues s  
t h a t  s e c r e t i v e n e s s  i s  a  f a i r l y  u n i v e r s a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h e  
s u b c u l t u r e  o f  p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  , which w i l l  i n f l u e n c e  the 
r i t u a l s  and p rocedu re s  t hey  need f o r  c o g n i t i v e  c o n s i s t e n c y  i n  
judgmental  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  p r o c e s s e s .  
Even w i t h  a  profound knowledge of  c u l t u r e s  and s u b c u l t u r e s ,  
v a l u e  sys tems  and r i t u a l  needs ,  p o l i t i c a l  and e s p e c i a l l y  ga rbage  
can  models o f  management c o n t r o l  sys tems  w i l l  l e a d  t o  cons ide r -  
a b l y  less p r e c i s e  p r e d i c t i o n s  of how c o n t r o l  w i l l  work, t h a n  
c y b e r n e t i c  models d o .  T h i s  e x p l a i n s  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  
of c y b e r n e t i c  models ,  a l s o  f o r  c o n t r o l  s i t u a t i o n s  where t hey  do 
n o t  a p p l y .  IIowever, I b e l i e v e  a  vague model t h a t  co r r e sponds  t o  
r e a l i t y  i s  s t i l l  p r e f e r a b l e  above a  p r e c i s e  model t h a t  does  n o t .  
k V  APPLICATION TO THE AREA OF BUDGETItJG 
Budgets  a r e  a  major  v e h i c l e  f o r  management c o n t r o l .  Most 
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  consume f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s ;  some 
a l s o  produce  such  r e s o u r c e s .  Money is u s u a l l y  the o n l y  common 
denominator  f o r  a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  which makes 
t h e  b u d ge t  sy s t em t h a t  tries t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  flow of  money i n t o  
a  f o c a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  management c o n t r o l  sys tem.  
From a n  a c c o u n t i n g  p o i n t  o f  view, budge t s  can  b e  c l a s s i f i e d  
a s  m a s t e r  budge t ,  depa r tmen t a l  budge t s ,  c a s h  budge t s ,  c a p i t a l  
b u d g e t s ,  s a l e s  budge t s ,  p roduc t i on  budge t s ,  etc . However, from 
a  management c o n t r o l  p o i n t  o f  view, t h r e e  t y p e s  o f  budge t s  shou ld  
be  p r i m a r i l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  (see T a b l e  1) : 
1. Inves tmen t  budge t s :  any a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  t o  
a s s e t s  t o  b e  used f o r  more t h a n  one  budge t  p e r i o d  ( t h e  
budge t  p e r i o d  i s  a lmos t  a lways  o n e  y e a r ) ;  
2&3. O p e r a t i o n s  budge t s  f o r  " i n p u t n  c e n t e r s ,  and o p e r a t i o n s  
budge t s  f o r  " inpu t -ou tpu t"  c e n t e r s  . Opera t i ons  budge t s  
are any a t t r i b u t i o n  of r e s o u r c e s  t o  one budge t  p e r i o d  
Table 1 .  Types of budgets from a management contro l  viewpoint.  
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TYPES OF MANAGEMENT 
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2: Expert Control 
4:  Intuitive Control 
5: Judgmental Control 
6: Political Control 
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o n l y .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  between " i n p u t "  c e n t e r s  and 
" i n p u t - o u t p u t "  c e n t e r s  i s  more commonly known i n  
Western l i t e r a t u r e  a s  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between "expense  
c e n t e r s "  and " p r o f i t  c e n t e r s " ,  b u t  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
p u b l i c  and n o t - f o r - p r o f i t  a c t i v i t i e s  t h e  word " p r o f i t "  
would b e  i l l - c h o s e n .  What t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  r e f e r s  t o  i s  
t h a t  f o r  some a c t i v i t y  c e n t e r s  i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  o n l y  t h e  
r e s o u r c e s  p u t  i n t o  them c a n  b e  exp re s sed  i n  money: t h e  
o u t p u t s  a r e  non-measurable (see page 4 )  . Bes ides  t h e  
examples c i t e d  e a r l i e r ,  w e  can  t h i n k  o f  p u b l i c  e d u c a t i o n  
sy s t ems ,  w e l f a r e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  h e a d q u a r t e r s  o f f i c e  
a c t i v i t i e s  or l a r g e  p r o d u c t i o n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  For o t h e r  
a c t i v i t y  c e n t e r s ,  bo th  i n p u t s  and o u t p u t s  c a n  b e  g i v e n  
a  money va lue :  p roduc t i on  u n i t s ,  t r a n s p o r t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  
u n i t s  p r o v i d i n g  s e r v i c e s  f o r  a f e e .  
The d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  t h r e e  t y p e s  of budge t s  i n  Tab le  
1 h a s  consequences  f o r  t h e  t y p e s  o f  management c o n t r o l  ( a cco rd ing  
t o  t h e  typo logy  o f  F i g u r e  1) t h a t  w i l l  b e  used .  See  t h e  second 
column o f  Tab l e  1. I nves tmen t  budge t s  a r e  mos t ly  n o n - r e p e t i t i v e  
which e x c ludes  c o n t r o l  Types 1 and 3 i n  F i g u r e  1; a l l  o t h e r  t y p e s  
may o c c u r  depend ing  on  whether  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  i nves tmen t  
a r e  unambiguous or ambiguous, i ts  o u t p u t s  measurable  o r  non- 
measurable ,  and e f f e c t s  of i n t e r v e n t i o n s  on t h e  a c t u a l  c o s t  known 
or unknown. O p e r a t i o n s  budge t s  f o r  i n p u t  c e n t e r s  a r e  by d e f i n i -  
t i o n  a  c a s e  o f  non-measurable o u t p u t s  which d e f i n e s  t h e  t y p e  o f  
c o n t r o l  t o  b e  u sed  a s  No. 5: judgmenta l ,  u n l e s s  a c c e p t a b l e  s u r -  
r o g a t e  measures c a n  b e  found i n  which c a s e  o u r  i n p u t  c e n t e r  be- 
comes a n  i n p u t - o u t p u t  c e n t e r .  Ope ra t i ons  budge t s  f o r  i npu t -ou tpu t  
c e n t e r s ,  a g a i n  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  r e p r e s e n t  a c a s e  o f  measurable  o u t -  
p u t s ;  a l s o ,  t h e y  almost a lways  d e a l  w i t h  r e p e t i t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
s o  t h a t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  t y p e s  o f  c o n t r o l  are No. 1: r o u t i n e  o r  
No. 3  : t r i a l - a n d - e r r o r  . 
The t h r e e  t y p e s  o f  budge t s  (1) p r e s e n t  d i f f e r e n t  problems 
t o  management ( t h a t  i s ,  t o  t h o s e  t r y i n g  t o  u s e  them f o r  c o n t r o l  
p u r p o s e s ) ;  ( 2 )  t h e y  d i s p o s e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  t o o l s  and t e chn iques  
and ( 3 )  t hey  l e a d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  of  s o c i a l  p r o c e s s e s  among 
t h e  peop le  i n v o l v e d  (see Tab l e  1, l a s t  three co lumns) .  
Inves tment  Budgets  
For i n v e s t m e n t  budge t s ,  t h e  major  management problem i s  
r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n :  t h e  c h o i c e  between a l t e r n a t i v e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  
o f  l i m i t e d  r e s o u r c e s .  The a v a i l a b l e  management t o o l s  and t e ch -  
n iques  f o r  i n v e s t m e n t  budge t i ng  a lmos t  i n v a r i a b l y  t r e a t  it a s  a n  
economic problem f o r  which a n  op t ima l  s o l u t i o n  can be  found by 
a p p r o p r i a t e  economic a n a l y s e s .  Such t e c h n i q u e s  a r e  d e s c r i b e d  i n  
t h e  Western l i t e r a t u r e  i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  t e x t b o o k s  o n  " C a p i t a l  
Budge t ingn .  A b a s i c  e lement  o f  most t e c h n i q u e s  i s  Discounted 
Cash Flow ( D  .C . F. ) : accoun t i ng  f o r  t h e  t i m e  v a l u e  o f  money, t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  one  Pound, F r anc  or Mark today exceeds  i t s  
v a l u e  a  y e a r  from now by a p e r c e n t a g e  which becomes a  v a r i a b l e  
or paramete r  i n  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  The non-economic a s p e c t s  o f  
r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  inves tment  budge t s  o f t e n  p l a y  a d e c i s ' v e  
r o l e  b u t  t hey  are n o t  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  t e c h n i q u e s .  l f  
Another t echn ique  used n o t  o n l y  i n  the s e l e c t i o n  phase of 
inves tments  b u t  a l s o  a t  l e a s t  p o t e n t i a l l y  u s e f u l  i n  t h e  execu t ion  
phase is  PERT (program Evalua t ion  Review Technique) .  An o f f -  
s p r i n g  of PERT i s  t h e  C r i t i c a l  Pa th  Method (CPM) . PERT and CPM 
a r e  supposed t o  h e l p  i n  planning and managing a  complex t a s k ,  
such as an inves tmen t ,  by i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  c r i t i c a l  pa th  ( t h e  
" b o t t l e n e c k n  f o r  t h e  d u r a t i o n  of t h e  e n t i r e  t a s k )  and planning 
eve ry th ing  else i n  f u n c t i o n  of t h i s  c r i t i c a l  p a t h .  A t  one t i m e ,  
a l l  U S  Defense Department c o n t r a c t s  r e q u i r e d  t h e  u se  o f  PERT as 
a c o n t r o l  t echn ique .  PERT uses  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  e s t i m a t e s  of  t h e  
d u r a t i o n  of v a r i o u s  s t e p s  i n  t h e  p roces s .  Where it usua l ly  f a i l s  
is i n  ach iev ing  e x p e r t  e s t i m a t e s  which are s u f f i c i e n t l y  unbiased 
t o  i n s p i r e  conf idence  i n  t h o s e  supposed to draw conc lus ions  from 
them (Anthony, 1972; Wildavsky, 1978:78) . 
The s o c i a l  p roces ses  involved i n  inves tment  budgeting a r e  
(1) t h e  wie ld ing  of  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power by t h o s e  i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  
bodies  whose h i e r a r c h i c a l  o r  s t a t u t o r y  p o s i t i o n  makes them i n t o  
d e c i s i o n - t a k e r s ;  t h i s  i s  p o l i t i c a l  power; (2)  p rocesses  of nego- 
t i a t i o n  between members o f  decision-making bod ie s ,  t h e i r  a d v i s o r s ,  
and a l l  k inds  o f  p a r t i e s  having s t a k e s  i n  t h e  dec i s ion ;  t h i s  is 
p o l i t i c a l  n e g o t i a t i o n ;  and (3)  sa lesmanship  on t h e  p a r t  of de- 
fendants of  p a r t i c u l a r  investments ;  t h i s  is  p o l i t i c a l  s t r a t e g y ,  
o r  g u i l e .  I n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  e x t e n s i v e  l i t e r a t u r e  on economic ana l -  
y s i s  f o r  inves tment  budge t ing  purposes ,  inves tment  budget  dec i -  
s i o n s  are r a r e l y  t a k e n  on t h e  b a s i s  of economic a n a l y s i s  r e s u l t s  
on ly ,  o r  even mainly .  Economic a n a l y s i s  is  o f t e n  only  used f o r  
c o n t r i b u t i n g  s t r a t e g i c  arguments, as p a r t  of  sa lesmanship,  and 
f o r  j u s t i f y i n g  c h o i c e s  t h a t  were predetermined by non-economic 
c r i t e r i a  i n  the f i r s t  p l a c e  (e.g., Aharoni, 1971) . I t  i s  n o t  s o  
impor t an t  t h a t  t h e  economic arguments suppor t ing  a n  investment  
d e c i s i o n  are r i g h t  i n  an  a b s o l u t e  sense ;  it i s  impor tan t  t h a t  
t hey  appea l  to t h e  decision-makers.  The r i g h t n e s s  o f  t h e  economic 
assumptions t h a t  went i n t o  investment  p roposa l s  i s  r a r e l y  checked 
a f t e rwards ;  and even i f  it is  checked, nobody is  l i k e l y  t o  l e a r n  
from any e r r o r s  d i scove red  (as t h e  p roces s  i s  non- repe t i t i ve )  . 
Opera t ions  Budgets f o r  Input/Output Cen te r s  
T h i s  is  t h e  bottom l i n e  ca t ego ry  i n  Table  1. Now, t h e  major 
management problem i s  performance mot iva t ion :  coord ina t ing  t h e  
e f f o r t s  of  t h e  people  involved towards obtaLning t h e  b e s t  p o s s i b l e  
r a t i o  of o u t p u t s  o v e r  i n p u t s .  This  i s  because i n p u t s  u s u a l l y  can- 
n o t  be  c o n t r o l l e d  by d i s c r e t i o n a r y  d e c i s i o n s  of management: i f  
i n p u t s  would b e  s topped ,  o u t p u t s  are d i s t u r b e d  and t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  
i s  t h e  o p p o s i t e  o f  what w a s  in tended .  A c l a s s i c a l  example 
(Hofs tede,  1967: 23) i s  t h e  s a l e s  o f f i c e  where a t  month's end a l l  
salesmen used t o  b e  s i t t i n g  a t  t h e i r  desks ,  because t h e i r  car 
expenses  w e r e  n o t  p a i d  beyond t h e  budget  l i m i t .  
The too l s / t echn iques  f o r  o p e r a t i o n s  budgets f o r  input/outpu t 
c e n t e r s  are t h e  c l a s s i c a l  budget c o n t r o l  methods: t h e  s e t t i n g  of 
g o a l s  expressed i n  money and t h e  feed ing  back o f  t h e  va r i ances  - 
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between goa l  and a c t u a l  outcome - t o  t hose  re- 
s p o n s i b l e  f o r  managing t h e  o p e r a t i o n s .  Many books aga in  cover  
t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s i d e  o f  t h e s e  t e c h n i q u e s  (there a r e  a  number 
of  v e r s i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  e a c h  c l a i m i n g  s u p e r i o r i t y  o v e r  o t h e r  v e r -  
s i o n s )  . S t u d i e s  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and human i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
these t e c h n i q u e s  are more r a r e  ( H o f s t e d e ,  1967;  Dunbar, 1971) . 
With a p p r o p r i a t e  l e a d e r s h i p ,  t h e  t e c h n i q u e  c a n  b e  q u i t e  e f f e c t i v e ;  
however t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  is  a more e s s e n t i a l  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  s u c c e s s  
t h a n  any p a r t i c u l a r  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  t e c h n i q u e ;  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  g r o s s  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  errors are avo ided .  Macro- inf luences  l i k e  t e c h -  
nology ( H o f s t e d e ,  1967: 2 8 6 f f )  , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  (Burns  
and Waterhouse,  1975)  and n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r e  (Aharon i ,  1971  :38; 
Hofs tede ,  1977) p l a y  a r o l e  i n  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  t e c h n i q u e  
as w e l l .  I n  T a b l e  1, I have  c a l l e d  t h e  b u d g e t - s e t t i n g  p r o c e s s  
needed i n  t h i s  case " s e m i - p a r t i c i p a t i v e " :  it s h o u l d  combine p a r -  
t i c i p a t i v e  i n p u t s  from t h o s e  h a v i n g  t o  f u l f i l  t h e  budge t ,  w i t h  
c e n t r a l  c o o r d i n a t i o n  to  r e s p e c t  o v e r a l l  c o n s t r a i n t s  ( H o f s t e d e ,  
1967:173ff )  . 
I n  o r d e r  t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  m o t i v a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  hav ing  t o  f u l -  
f i l  t h e  b u d g e t ,  f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  are sometimes used.  The 
u n a v o i d a b l e  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  o f  b u d g e t a r y  s t a n d a r d s  makes them p o o r  
b a s e s  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s ,  and i n  my e a r l i e r  s t u d y  I a d v i s e  
s t r o n g l y  a g a i n s t  budge t -va r i ance  b a s e d  f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  
( H o f s t e d e ,  1967:257) .  Budget accompl ishment  c a n ,  however, b e  a 
s e n s i b l e  c r i t e r i o n  i n  a n o t h e r  m o t i v a t i o n a l  " t echn ique" :  Manage- 
ment By O b j e c t i v e s  (MBO) . I n  MBO, s u b o r d i n a t e s  n e g o t i a t e  p e r i o d -  
i c a l l y  ( u s u a l l y  once  a y e a r )  w i t h  t h e i r  b o s s  q u a l i t a t i v e  and/or  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  o b j e c t i v e s  t o  b e  f u l f i l l e d ;  t h e i r  f u l f i l m e n t  i s  d i s -  
c u s s e d ,  a l so  p e r i o d i c a l l y ,  between the two o f  them, which s h o u l d  
l e a d  t o  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  W e  s h a l l  m e e t  MBO a g a i n  below. I 
s h a l l  a r g u e  t h a t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ,  it o n l y  f u n c t i o n s  p r o p e r l y  
where r e s u l t s  are measurab le ,  which  i s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t r u e  f o r  
i n p u t / o u t p u t  c e n t e r s .  MBO i n  s u c h  cases, i f  a p p l i e d  w i t h  s u f f i -  
c i e n t  l e a d e r s h i p  s k i l l ,  c a n  b e  a u s e f u l  m o t i v a t i o n a l  tool:  be- 
c a u s e  it r e p l a c e s  t h e  i m p e r s o n a l  au tomat i sm o f  a f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n -  
t i v e  by a p e r s o n a l i z e d  b u t  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  s u p p o r t e d  e v a l u a t i o n .  
I n  f a c t ,  i n p u t / o u t p u t  c e n t e r s  may b e  t h e  o n l y  p l a c e s  i n  which 
MJ3O r e a l l y  works .  
The social  p r o c e s s e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  o p e r a t i o n s  b u d g e t i n g  f o r  
i n p u t / o u t p u t  c e n t e r s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  above,  are p r i m a r i l y  
l e a d e r s h i p  w i t h  i t s  u n a v o i d a b l e  mirror image: s u b o r d i n a t e s h i p - -  
b e c a u s e  e f f e c t i v e  l e a d e r s h i p  c o n s i s t s  o f  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  role de- 
manded by t h e  s u b o r d i n a t e s h i p  t h a t  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
and n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r e  ( H o f s t e d e ,  1979)  . L e a d e r s h i p ,  s u b o r d i n a t e -  
s h i p ,  t h e  t a s k  a t  hand,  t h e  c u l t u r a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d  needs o f  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  members a l l  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  a  p a t t e r n  o f  m o t i v a t i o n - -  
which may or  may n o t  h e l p  towards  b u d g e t  f u l f i l m e n t .  The m o s t  
e s s e n t i a l  socia l  p r o c e s s  which forms t h e  main theme o f  my earlier 
book ( H o f s t e d e ,  1967) i s  amesmanshi . Budget ing  i s  a lways  a 
game o f  s t r a t e g y - - t h i s  a p p l i e s  %--f t o  a 1 t h r e e  t y p e s  o f  b u d g e t s  i n  
T a b l e  1. I n  i n p u t - o u t p u t  c e n t e r s ,  it s h o u l d  also b e  s e e n  a s  a 
game o f  s k i l l :  t h e  m o t i v a t i o n  i s  o p t i m a l  i f  a l l  actors i n v o l v e d  
c o n s i d e r  b u d g e t a r y  t a r g e t s  as w o r t h w h i l e  c h a l l e n g e s  whose a t t a i n -  
ment is  h i g h l y  d e s i r a b l e  b u t  whose non-a t t a inment  i s  a n  a c c e p t e d  
r i s k .  
Operat ions  Budgets f o r  I n p u t  Cen te r s  
The middle type  of  budget  i n  Table  1, t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  budget  
f o r  i n p u t  c e n t e r s ,  i s  t h e  most p rob lemat ic  c a s e  from a  management 
viewpoint  because it poses  bo th  k inds  of  problems: r e sou rce  a l -  
l o c a t i o n  p l u s  performance mot iva t ion .  Resource a l l o c a t i o n ,  be- 
cause  t h e  r e sou rces  cou ld ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  t heo ry ,  b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  
a l t e r n a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  o r  n o t  a t  a l l ,  wi thou t  any immediate mea- 
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s u r a b l e  e f f e c t  on o u t p u t s .  Performance mot iva t ion ,  because i n  
o r d e r  t o  f u l f i l  t h e  mi s s ion  of t h e  c e n t e r ,  t h e  e f f o r t s  of t h e  
people  involved have t o  be  cons idered ,  even though t h e  o u t p u t s  
are non-measurable: management c o n t r o l  i n  t h i s  c a s e  c o n s i s t s  of 
o b t a i n i n g  a performance of t h e  c e n t e r  t h a t  is s u b j e c t i v e l y  and 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y  opt imal ,  or a t  least s a t i s f a c t o r y .  
Opera t ions  budgets  f o r  i n p u t  c e n t e r s  a r e  t h e  domain where 
techniques  have most p r o l i f e r a t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  t w o  decades .  
Like t h e  o t h e r  t echniques  mentioned earlier i n  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  a l l  
of t h e s e  o r i g i n a t e d  i n  t h e  USA which has  always been a  c a p t i v e  
market f o r  new o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  t o o l s - - t o o l s  t h a t  are e a s i l y  adopted 
b u t  e a s i l y  dropped as w e l l .  The b e s t  known t echn ique  i n  t h i s  area 
is Programming Planning Budget ing System (PPBS) . I t  o r i g i n a t e d  
i n  t h e  e a r l y  1960s when Rober t  McNamara moved from t h e  t o p  manage- 
ment of t h e  Ford Corpora t ion  t o  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of S e c r e t a r y  o f  
Defense. PPBS t r a n s f e r s  t h e  i d e a  o f  "produc t  management" from 
p r i v a t e  b u s i n e s s  t o  p u b l i c  and n o t - f o r - p r o f i t  a c t i v i t i e s .  Produc t  
management, however, assumes a  s i t u a t i o n  of measurable o u t p u t s :  
an  i npu t /ou tpu t  c e n t e r .  I n  t r a n s f e r r i n g  i ts  phi losophy t o  t h e  
n o t - f o r - p r o f i t  s e c t o r ,  t h e  p r o t a g o n i s t s  of t h e  system have r a t h e r  
l i g h t l y  walked over  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  (F igu re  1) many o b j e c t i v e s  h e r e  
are ambiguous, and o u t p u t s  non-measurable . They have assumed 
t h a t  by " t r y i n g  h a r d e r " ,  a m b i g u i t i e s  could b e  r e so lved  and accep t -  
a b l e  s u r r o g a t e  measures f o r  o u t p u t  could b e  found, t hus  r e p l a c i n g  
(F igu re  1) p l i t i c a l  and judgmental c o n t r o l  by one of t h e  s i m p l e r  
t ypes .  PPBS impl ied:  (1) focuss ing  on programs r a t h e r  t han  on 
d e  a r tmen t s  i n  planning and budget ing,  which meant f o c u s s i n g  on +o u t p u t s  ra  er t han  i n p u t s  and (2 )  t a k i n g  i n t o  accoun t  a t i m e  
hor i zon  beyond t h e  s i n g l e  y e a r  f o r  which o p e r a t i o n s  budgets  are 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  made. I n  f a c t ,  i n  Table  1 t h i s  means t h a t  t h e  mid- 
d l e  type  of budget  is " d i s s o l v e d n  by making it a t  t h e  same t i m e  
more l i k e  t h e  lower t y p e  ( focus  on o u t p u t s )  and l i k e  t h e  upper 
t y p e  (more-than-one-year t i m e  hor izon)  . 
The impact  of PPBS h a s  been e x t e n s i v e l y  documented (Anthony, 
1972; Lyden and ~ i l l e r ,  1972; Wildavsky, 1975, 1978a,  1978b; 
Jablonsky and Di rsmi th ,  1978, Hofs tede,  1978) . I t  h a s  most ly  
been cons ide red  a  f a i l u r e ,  because it has  bu r i ed  t h e  fundamental 
p o l i t i c a l  and judgmental c h o i c e s  i n  n o t - f o r - p r o f i t  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  
" techniques"  and paperwork, making i t s  own c o s t - b e n e f i t  ba l ance  
nega t ive .  PPBS has  been expor ted  to o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  e n t h u s i a s t i c  r e p o r t s  of t h o s e  
hav ing  a s t a k e  i n  i n t r o d u c i n g  it, and by a c u r i o u s  p roces s  of i n -  
e r t i a  i n  t h e  communication o f  expe r i ence ,  it was and s t i l l  i s  
in t roduced  as t h e  road  to s a l v a t i o n  i n  some o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a f t e r  
it h a s  long been a b o l i s h e d  as  a f a i l u r e  i n  o t h e r s .  A sobe r  eva l -  
u a t i o n  of PPBS is a s t a t e m e n t  from D e r l i e n  (1978b) about  t h e  
r e s u l t s  o f  PPBS-inspired re fo rms  i n  t h e  German F e d e r a l  Bureau- 
c r a c y :  t h e  re fo rms  have r e p r e s e n t e d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  s h i f t  i n  t h e  
a t t i t u d e s  of  b u r e a u c r a t s .  Measured by t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
r e f o r m e r s ,  t h e y  have  f a i l e d ;  measured by t h e  much more modest  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  u s e r s ,  t h e y  h a v e  succeeded.16 
Another  t e c h n i q u e  a p p l i e d  a t  i n p u t  c e n t e r s  f o r  c r e a t i n g  man- 
agement c o n t r o l  where the budge t  f a i l s  t o  do so i s  Management By 
O b j e c t i v e s  (MBO) which w e  a l r e a d y  m e t  f o r  u s e  i n  i n p u t / o u t p u t  
c e n t e r s .  I n  t h e  USA, MBO h a s  been used  o n  a  m a s s i v e  s c a l e  a s  a  
c o n t r o l  tool  f o r  such  i n p u t  c e n t e r s  a s  government o f f i c e s  and 
u n i v e r s i t i e s .  Its ach ievements  a r e  v e r y  modest,  however; it 
seems to  work (and s t i l l  o n l y  under  c e r t a i n  l e a d e r s h i p / s u b o r d i n -  
a t e s h i p  c o n d i t i o n s )  where r e s u l t s  a r e  unambiguously measurab le ,  
t h a t  i s  i n  i n p u t / o u t p u t  c e n t e r s  ( I v a n c e v i c h ,  1974; H o f s t e d e ,  1 9 7 8 ) .  
I n  i n p u t  c e n t e r s ,  MBO t e n d s  t o  f a i l  f o r  t w o  r e a s o n s :  (1) it i s  
b a s e d  o n  n a i v e  assumpt ions  o n  the p s y c h o l o g i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  between 
s u p e r i o r s  and s u b o r d i n a t e s  who w i l l  n o t  a g r e e  o n  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  
o f  r e s u l t s ,  even i f  t h e y  a g r e e d  e a r l i e r  o n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  
o b j e c t i v e s  and ( 2 )  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  o b j e c t i v e s  from r e s o u r c e s  
and c o n s t r a i n t s  is  a  s e m a n t i c  e x e r c i s e  which h a s  l i t t l e  t o  do 
w i t h  t h e  r e a l i t y  of  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  l i f e .  Wildavsky ( 1978a: 79) 
s t a t e s :  " . . . o b j e c t i v e s  by t h e m s e l v e s  a r e  mean ing less :  t h e y  s u g g e s t  
t h a t  e v e r y t h i n g  may be  o b t a i n e d  and n o t h i n g  need b e  g i v e n  up. 
O b j e c t i v e s  make s e n s e  o n l y  i n  the c o n t e x t  o f  r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  
to  a c h i e v e  them t o g e t h e r  w i t h  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
f o r e g o n e .  Y e t  c o n s i d e r i n g  o p p o r t u n i t y  cost immedia te ly  s u g g e s t s  
a  f u l l - s c a l e  a n a l y s i s ,  which,  presumably ,  MBO i s  d e s i g n e d  t o  
a v o i d "  . 
A t h i r d  t e c h n i q u e  deve loped  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r  i n p u t  c e n t e r s ,  
is  Zero Base ~ u d g e t i n g  (ZBB) . ZBB h a s  a l s o  o r i g i n a t e d  i n  US p r i -  
v a t e  i n d u s t r y  ( a t  Texas I n s t r u m e n t s )  and was t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  
US p u b l i c  sector i n  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 6 0 s .  The i d e a  is  that the b u d g e t  
f o r  i n p u t  c e n t e r s  i s  s p l i t  by a c t i v i t i e s ,  and t h a t  f o r  e a c h  
a c t i v i t y ,  v a r i o u s  l e v e l s  o f  e x p e n s e  w i t h  t h e i r  e x p e c t e d  conse -  
quences  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d ,  i n c l u d i n g  a z e r o  l e v e l .  S u b s e q u e n t l y ,  
dec i s ion-makers  r ank  the a c t i v i t i e s  i n  o r d e r  o f  d e s i r a b i l i t y ,  and 
the a c t u a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  l e v e l  of  r e s o u r c e s  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  c u t o f f  
p o i n t  beyond which a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  n o t  b e  funded.  T h i s  may t h e n  
l e a d  t o  some a c t i v i t i e s  b e i n g  d i s c o n t i n u e d  a l t o g e t h e r ,  others 
reduced ,  w h i l e  s t i l l  others a r e  expanded a t  t h e  same t i m e .  The 
documenta t ion  o n  ZBB i s  e x t e n s i v e  (e  .g. ,  Anthony and H e r z l i n g e r ,  
1975: 245; Wildavsky, 1975,  1978~a,  1978b; Cheek, 1977; B a r i f f  and 
G a l b r a i t h  1978; S a r a n t ,  1978; Wholey, 1978;  Draper  and P i t s v a d a ,  
1979; H e r z l i n g e r ,  1979) . I t  was s t r o n g l y  promoted by Governor 
Jimmy C a r t e r  o f  t h e  S t a t e  o f  Georg ia ,  and a g a i n  ( b u t  somewhat 
less s t r o n g l y )  by him i n  t h e  US F e d e r a l  Government a f t e r  h i s  
e l e c t i o n  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n c y ,  A l l  i n  a l l ,  r e p o r t s  on  i t s  e f f e c t s  
are n o t  o p t i m i s t i c  (Wildavsky,  1975:  278 : "Some b u t t e r f l i e s  were 
c a u g h t ,  no e l e p h a n t s  s t o p p e d " )  . The r e a s o n s  a r e  (1) d e c i s i o n  
packages  f o r  which dec i s ion-makers  have  to  se t  p r i o r i t i e s  soon  
become unwieldy i n  s i z e  so t h a t  informed d e c i s i o n s  c a n  n o  more 
be t a k e n ;  t h e  paperwork becomes e x t r e m e l y  c o s t l y ,  i t s  costs f a r  
e x c e e d i n g  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  b e n e f i t s  and ( 2 )  l i k e  PPBS and MBO, ZBB 
i s  b a s e d  o n  n a i v e  assumpt ions  a b o u t  human r e a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  sys tem 
and about  p e o p l e ' s  p o l i t i c a l  behavior  and psycho log ica l  impact on 
each o t h e r .  ~t is  extremely u n l i k e l y  t h a t  managers w i l l  submit 
ZBB budget p roposa l s  t h a t  would, i f  accep ted ,  p u t  t h e m  o u t  of  
t h e i r  own job; they  d i s p o s e  of many p o l i t i c a l  "ploys"  t o  avoid 
such proposa ls ,  o r  t o  make a b s o l u t e l y  s u r e  t h a t  they w i l l  n o t  be  
accepted.  B e n e f i c i a l  a s p e c t s  of  a ZBB approach c a n  on ly  be  ex- 
pec ted  given a number o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s :  (1) a much s i m p l i f i e d  ver-  
s i o n ,  i n  which t h e  r e q u e s t  i s  n o t  t o  cons ide r  r e d u c t i o n  of a c t i v i -  
t i e s  t o  ze ro ,  b u t  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  e f f e c t  of  marg ina l  r e d u c t i o n s  
or a d d i t i o n s  o f  budget ( s ay ,  + o r  -15%) and ( 2 )  a p p r o p r i a t e  de- 
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  s o  t h a t  d e c i s i o n s  would be  t aken  on r e l a t i v e l y  
s m a l l  packages of a 1  t e r n a t i v e s  by people s u f f i c i e n t l y  c l o s e  t o  
t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  be  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  t h e i r  d e t a i l s .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  
ZBB i s  mainly a t echnique  f o r  s t i m u l a t i n g  t r a d e - o f f s  between bud- 
g e t  items, a l l e v i a t i n g  t h e  r i g i d i t y  o f  i t emized  budgets i n  which 
money can  on ly  be used f o r  i t e m s  s p e c i f i e d ;  i t e m i z a t i o n  is  a 
common f e a t u r e  o f  p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  budge ts  which l eads  
to over-spending and demot iva t ion  (Aharoni,  1971) .  
The a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  t h e  pre-packaged t echn iques  mentioned 
(PPBS, MBO, ZBB) i n  t h e  c a s e  of i n p u t  c e n t e r s  are forms of  P o l i c y  
Analys i s  and Program Eva lua t ion  (Wildavsky , 1972, 1978a; Abt, 
1976):  a u d i t s  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  by, u s u a l l y ,  s p e c i a l  teams i n c l u d i n g  
a l l  t h e i r  impacts:  f i n a n c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and psychologica l ,  This  
i s  no easy s o l u t i o n  e i t h e r .  Having such a u d i t s  r e p r e s e n t s  i n  
i t s e l f  a p o l i t i c a l  c h o i c e ,  and decision-makers w i l l  always be 
tempted t o  r e j e c t  t h e i r  r e s u l t s .  Analys t s  and e v a l u a t o r s  b r i n g  
t h e i r  own b i a s e s  to  t h e i r  a u d i t s  (Van d e  Val1 and Bolas,  1977) . 
P o l i c y  Analysis  and Program Evalua t ion ,  however, a t  l e a s t  do no t  
sugges t  s i m p l i s t i c  ways of d e a l i n g  wi th  complex problems, and 
they  do n o t  c o n t a i n  b u i l t - i n  na ive  assumptions nor b u i l t - i n  moun- 
t a i n s  of paperwork. 
The s o c i a l  p roces ses  i n  o p e r a t i o n s  budge t ing  f o r  i n p u t  
c e n t e r s  a r e  very complex, as they combine t h o s e  desc r ibed  f o r  
investment  budge ts  w i th  t h o s e  desc r ibed  f o r  o p e r a t i o n s  budgets  
f o r  i npu t /ou tpu t  c e n t e r s .  For people working under such a system, 
bo th  sa lesmanship and gamesmanship a r e  a t  a premium, b u t  t h e  
games played tend t o  be games of s t r a t e g y  ( p o l i t i c a l  games) r a t h e r  
t h a n  games of  s k i l l  (performance m o t i v a t i o n ) .  The r o l e  o f  l eader -  
s h i p  i n  t h i s  case i s ,  t a k i n g  account of  t h e  t ype  of subord ina te -  
s h i p  p r e v a i l i n g ,  t o  t u r n  t h e  game a s  much as p o s s i b l e  i n t o  a s k i l l  
game . 
THE CHOICE OF MODELS: TYPE I AND TYPE I1 ERRORS 
The argument i n  t h e  prev ious  s e c t i o n s  can be  summed up a s  
fo l lows:  t h e r e  a r e  two main c a t e g o r i e s  o f  management c o n t r o l  
s i t u a t i o n s .  The f i r s t  are t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  r o u t i n e ,  mechanis t ic  
s i t u a t i o n s ,  cor responding  t o  Type 1--and marg ina l ly  2 and 3--in 
F igu re  1. For  t h i s  ca t ego ry ,  a c y b e r n e t i c  model i s  a p p r o p r i a t e .  
These s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  no t  t o o  dependent on t h e  a c t o r s  ' values--  
a l though human behavior  does  p lay  a r o l e  i n  them and pseudo- 
c o n t r o l  i s  a danger--and f o r  managing them, t h e  w e l l  known t r a d i -  
t i o n a l  management p r i n c i p l e s  ( t e c h n i c a l ,  economical,  psychologica l )  
a p p l y .  The second c a t e g o r y  a r e  the non - rou t i ne ,  i l l - d e f i n e d ,  
i l l - s t r u c t u r e d  s i t u a t i o n s ,  co r r e spond ing  t o  Type 4 and e s p e c i a l l y  
5 and 6 i n  F i g u r e  1. For  t h i s  c a t e g o r y ,  t h e  c y b e r n e t i c  model 
e m p h a t i c a l l y  does n o t  app ly  and it may l e a d  t o  a  dangerous cover-  
i n g  up o f  the r e a l  i s s u e s  which a r e  o f  a  " p o l i t i c a l "  n a t u r e ,  
l a r g e l y  de te rmined  by v a l u e s  and r i t u a l s .  For  t h i s  c a t e g o r y ,  
o n l y  vague "models" e x i s t :  I mentioned a  p o l i t i c a l  one and a  
"garbage can"  one .  
The p r a c t i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n  t o  be  drawn from t h i s  dichotomy is 
t h a t  b e f o r e  w e  u s e  a  model ( o r  w e  cou ld  c a l l  it a  paradigm) t o  
d e s c r i b e  o r  a n a l y s e  a management c o n t r o l  s i t u a t i o n ,  w e  should  
f i r s t  c a r e f u l l y  s t u d y  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h a t  s i t u a t i o n  which d e t e r -  
mines which model o r  paradigm is  a p p r o p r i a t e .  T h i s  i s  why i n  
t h e  b e g i nn ing  of t h i s  paper  I s t r e s s e d  l ook ing  a t  a c t i v i t i e s  
r a t h e r  t h a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s :  d i f f e r e n t  models may app ly  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  same o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  
There  a r e ,  i n  f a c t ,  two t y p e s  o f  e r r o r s  w e  c a n  make. These 
a r e  ana logous  t o  t h e  "Type I "  and "Type 11"  e r r o r s  i n  s t a t i s t i c a l  
h y p o t h e s i s  t e s t i n g .  A Type I e r r o r  means r e j e c t i n g  a  t r u e  hypo- 
t he s i s ;  a Type 1 1 - e r r o r  a c c e p t i n g  a f a l s e  . h y p o t h e s i s .  I n  our  
case, a Type I e r r o r  means n o t  u s i n g  a c y b e r n e t i c  approach where 
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  meets t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  it.  A T v ~ e  I1 e r r o r  means 
- - 
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  u s e  a c y b e r n e t i c  approach  where th;? s i t u a t i o n  does  
n o t  meet t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  i t  ( ~ a n d a u  and S t o u t ,  197911) . 
Type I e r r o r s  a r e  q u i t e  f r e q u e n t  i n  non-production p u b l i c  
and no t - fo r -p rof  it  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  (Anthony, 1972 : 23) , because  i n  
t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s u b c u l t u r e s  t h e  concern  f o r  c o s t  and e f  f e c -  
t i v e n e s s  h a s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been mi s s ing .  ~ u l s h o f  's (1979) paper  
i s  a n  i l l u s t r a t i v e  case (see page 7 ) .  The c o n t r o l  problem i s  
t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  t o  a  Dutch S o c i a l  Wel fa re  o rgan i za -  
t i o n ,  which s o  f a r  h a s  been e n t i r e l y  judgmenta l .  The s u b c u l t u r e  
o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  is  one o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m  and a  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  
t h i n k i n g  i n  terms of  " e f f i c i e n c y "  when d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  c l i e n t s .  
However, a  growing d i s p r o p o r t i o n  between (1) t h e  number o f  c l i e n t s ,  
(2 )  t h e  amount o f  t i m e  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  t h i n k  t h e y  shou ld  spend 
o n  each  c l i e n t  and ( 3 )  t h e  s h o r t  and long- term a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  
r e s o u r c e s  f o r c e s  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  do some k ind  o f  consc ious  
p r i o r i t y - s e t t i n g  which i s  a form o f  performance c o n t r o l  w i t h i n  
t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  se t  by a v a i l a b l e  r e s o u r c e s .  Hulshof s h w s  t h a t  
b e c a u s e  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  h i g h l y  r e p e t i t i v e ,  s t a t i s t i c a l  d a t a  
c a n  be c o l l e c t e d  on  t i m e  devoted t o  c a s e s .  For t h e s e  t o  b e  
mean ingfu l ,  h w e v e r ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  have  t o  d e s i g n  some c l a s s i f i c a -  
t i o n  o f  c a s e s ,  which they  t end  t o  resist .  The r e p e t i t i v e n e s s  o f  
the p r o c e s s  makes it l i k e l y  t h a t  a  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  p o s s i b l e  
which can  be used  a s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  an a c c e p t a b l e  s u r r o g a t e  o u t p u t  
measure; w i t h  t h i s ,  t h e  t y p e  o f  c o n t r o l  becomes no.  3  i n  F igu re  
1: t r i a l - a n d - e r r o r  c o n t r o l ,  t o  which a c y b e r n e t i c  phi losophy does  
a p p l y .  The main problem i n  t h i s  case is  one  o f  i n t r o d u c t i o n :  t o  
overcome t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  r e s i s t a n c e  o f  t h e s e  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  t o  
e f f i c i e n c y  t h i n k i n g  where such  t h i n k i n g  c a n  b e  b e n e f i c i a l  t o  a l l .  
More i n  g e n e r a l ,  obv ious  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which Type I e r r o r s  c a n  
be expec ted  a r e  a l l  r e p e t i t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  non-product ion,  
p u b l i c  and n o t - f o r - p r o f i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ;  t h e  more r o u t i n e  t h e  
a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  more a p p l i c a b l e  is t h e  c y b e r n e t i c  paradigm. 
- Whereas Type I e r r o r s  i n  non-production, p u b l i c  and not- for-  
p r o f i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t end  to b e  many b u t  each  of them r e l a t i v e l y  
sma l l ,  i nvo lv ing  o n l y  a  l i m i t e d  p a r t  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  Type I1 
e r r o r s  t end  t o  b e  few b u t  l a r g e .  Type I1 e r r o r s  a r e  made when 
l a r g e - s c a l e ,  sweeping techniques  a r e  i n t roduced  t o  improve manage- 
ment c o n t r o l  p roces ses  of  t h e  judgmental and p o l i t i c a l  type,  pro- 
grams which a t  c l o s e r  s c r u t i n y  use  a  c y b e r n e t i c  paradigm. m T i m e  
and aga in ,  c o n t r o l  sys tems,  imposed i n  t h e  name o f  e r r o r  preven- 
t i o n ,  r e s u l t  on ly  i n  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  of s e a r c h  procedures ,  t h e  
c u r t a i l m e n t  of t h e  freedom t o  ana lyse ,  and a  gene ra l  i n a b i l i t y  
t o  d e t e c t  and c o r r e c t  e r r o r n  (Landau and S t o u t ,  1979: 26) 18.  A s  
examples o f  such Type I1 e r r o r  c a s e s  w e  saw t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting (PPBS) ; Management By Ob jec t ives  
(MBO) ; and Zero-Base Budgeting ( Z BB)  . Under c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
MBO and a  s i m p l i f i e d  form of ZBB may work; b u t  a  sweeping i n t r o -  
duc t ion  wi thou t  r e g a r d  f o r  t h o s e  c o n d i t i o n s  i s  a  Type I1 e r r o r .  
CONTROL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
Cyberne t ic  c o n t r o l  systems,  p a r a d o x i c a l l y ,  a r e  systems t h a t  
do n o t  l e a r n .  By keeping t h e  a c t i v i t y  on  t a r g e t ,  they prevent  
i t  from l e a r n i n g .  The c o n t r o l  p roces ses  t h a t  a l low t h e  organiza-  
t i o n  t o  l e a r n  a r e  t h e  non-cybernet ic  ones ,  t h e  judgmental and 
t h e  p o l i t i c a l .  I n  a  changing world,  a  t u r b u l e n t  environment 
(Emery and T r i s t ,  1969) t h e  a d a p t a t i o n  and t h e r e f o r e  t h e  long- 
term s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  depends upon t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
o f  t h e s e  p roces ses ,  n o t  t o  keep t h e  a c t i v i t y  on t a r g e t ,  b u t  t o  
choose t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  t a r g e t s  a t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  t ime.  The 
l a r g e r  and more complex an o r g a n i z a t i o n  o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  network, 
t h e  g r e a t e r  i t s  i n e r t i a .  W e  saw (page 1 2 )  t h a t  s t anda rd  ope ra t -  
i n g  procedures  sometimes prevent  i n d i v i d u a l s  from r e a c t i n g  on 
feedback s i g n a l s .  T h i s  tendency i s  much s t r o n g e r  a t  t h e  organ- 
i z a t i o n a l  o r  i n t e r - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  l e v e l  and l e a d s  t o  "dynamic 
conservat ism" (Schon, 1971: 31 f f )  : f i g h t i n g  l i k e  mad t o  s t a y  t h e  
same19 . 
E c o l o g i s t s  have s t u d i e d  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of  s p e c i e s  t o  s u r v i v e  
under d r a m a t i c a l l y  changing c i rcumstances .  The key t o  such su r -  
v i v a l  i s  n o t  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  b u t  a  p rope r ty  which has  been c a l l e d  
r e s i l i e n c e  (Ho l l i ng ,  1973; Vayda and McCay, 1975) :  near-synonyms 
a r e  u l t r a s  t a b i  li t y  , homeostas is ,  coping,  a d a p t i v i t y  , robus tnes s  . 
R e s i l i e n t  systems have been modelled a s  r e g u l a r  f i r s t - o r d e r  cyber- 
n e t i c  feedback c y c l e s  w i th  a  second-order l o o p  superimposed on 
i t ,  which p e r i o d i c a l l y  a d j u s t s  t he  s t a n d a r d s  of t h e  f i r s t - l o o p  
c y c l e  i f  t h e  s u r v i v a l  of  t h e  organism under t h e  changed environ-  
mental c o n d i t i o n s  a s k s  f o r  it; however t h i s  second-order l oop  
has  s t anda rds  t h a t  a r e  judgmental o r  p o l i t i c a l l y  determined.  
T h i s  h igher -order  c y b e r n e t i c  "modeln has  f o r  example been des- 
c r i b e d  by Ashby (1965:7/26) and a p p l i e d  t o  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s i t u a -  
t i o n s  by Cant ley (1973) and Argyr i s  (1977) : the l a t t e r  speaks  o f  
mdouble-loop l e a r n i n g " .  
The worrying q u e s t i o n  is: i n  view o f  t h e  predominant tend- 
ency of i n d i v i d u a l s  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s  to move t o  mstandard  ope ra t -  
i n g  proceduresn  (which i s  s i n g l e  l o o p  l e a r n i n g ) ,  who w i l l  t e ach  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  double- loop t r i c k s ?  The t r a d i t i o n s ,  dominant 
v a l u e s ,  and p o l i t i c a l  systems of c o u n t r i e s  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
c o n s t r a i n  t h e  o p t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  managers i n  t h i s  respect 
(Hofs tede,  1979) and they  a r e  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  recommendations 
found i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  
From the USA, Argyr i s  (1977) assumes t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a 
conve r s ion  t o  double- loop l e a r n i n g  of t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  ' t o p  
decision-makers.  March has  developed h i s  garbage-can model based 
on US exper iences20 ,  i n  combination w i t h  Scandinavian examples. 
The i d e a  o f  "semi-confusing" in format ion  systems t o  d e s t a b i l i z e  
s t a n d a r d  o p e r a t i n g  procedures  comes from Sweden (Hedberg and 
Jbnsson,  1978: see n o t e  11) . I n  a c a s e  s tudy  of a l a r g e  Dutch 
c o r p o r a t i o n  (Hofs tede ,  1980) I s u g g e s t  ano ther  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s o l u t i o n  t o  double-loop l ea rn ing :  t h e  appointment of a person i n  
a " c o u r t  j e s t e r "  r o l e ,  whose t a s k  it i s  to  c o l l e c t  t h e  weak and 
sup res sed  s i g n a l s  from t h e  environment and have d i r e c t  acces s  t o  
t h e  t o p  decision-makers w i th  unpopular news. I n  many c o u n t r i e s  
w e  f i n d  forms of P o l i c y  ~ n a l y s i s ,  Program Eva lua t ion  and o t h e r  
k i n d s  of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  a u d i t i n g  by o u t s i d e  a g e n t s  (see a l s o  
page 21) ;  t h e i r  outcome i s  second-order feedback which, i f  used,  
l e a d s  t o  double- loop lea rn ing21 .  A l l  double-loop l e a r n i n g  ap- 
proaches  mentioned s o  f a r  focus  very  much on t h e  top of t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  An i n n o v a t i v e  s o l u t i o n  f o r  a management c o n t r o l  
sys tem w i t h  double-loop c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  f o r  u s e  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  of  
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  is  Machin1s (1975, 1977, 1978) Expec ta t ions  
Approach. I t  was developed i n  Grea t  B r i t a i n  and r e f l e c t s  a B r i t i s h  
t o l e r a n c e  f o r  ambigui ty  which w i l l  n o t  a s  e a s i l y  be  accepted i n  
c u l t u r e s  w i t h  a s t r o n g e r  need f o r  formal  r u l e s .  I n  t h e  expecta-  
t i o n s  approach,  each  manager d e f i n e s  what he expec t s  from every  
o t h e r  manager w i t h  whom he  i n t e r a c t s  i n  h i s  d a i l y  job, and what 
he  b e l i e v e s  every  o t h e r  manager e x p e c t s  o f  him. These expec ta -  
t i o n s  a r e  l i s t e d  and s o r t e d  by computer, and compared f o r  every  
p a i r  of  managers. Disagreements a r e  subsequent ly  i roned  o u t .  
Although t h i s  looks  l i k e  a communications a u d i t ,  it i s  a c o n t r o l  
sys tem a s  w e l l ,  because it should r e v e a l  i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and i n -  
e f f i c i e n c y  ( r e f l e c t e d  i n  non-matching e x p e c t a t i o n s )  and a1 l o w  t o  
e l i m i n a t e  it.  I t  should  be  r e p e a t e d  p e r i o d i c a l l y .  
Ka r l  Popper h a s  warned us  t o  beware o f  syste'ms t h a t  promise 
maximum good t o  everybody, because t h e s e  u s u a l l y  t u r n  o u t  t o  
b r i n g  maximum e v i l .  H e  sugges t s  t o  go f o r  minimum e v i l ;  t h i s  i s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  an  i n c r e m e n t a l i s t  approach,  f i t t i n g  wi th  Lindblomls 
(1959) "muddling through" and a l s o  defended by Wildavsky (1975) 22. 
The garbage can model of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c h o i c e  a s  d e s c r i b e d  
e a r l i e r ,  a l though  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  b e a u t i f u l ,  may b e  t h e  most 
r e a l i s t i c  model o f  how o r g a n i z a t i o n s  do  i n  f a c t  l e a r n  o r  n o t  
l e a r n .  Rather  t h a n  from making new and c o s t l y  Type I1 e r r o r s ,  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and p o l i t i e s  may b e n e f i t  from incrementa l  improve- 
ments t o  t h e i r  c h o i c e  "garbage c a n s " .  
One p a r t i c i p a n t  a t  t h e  EIASM-IIASA workshop, Luc Wilkin from 
Belgium, remarked t h a t  t o  t h e  accoun tan t s  i n  t h e  group " c o n t r o l "  
t ended  t o  be  viewed a s  a s o l u t i o n ,  t o  t h e  s o c i o l o g i s t s  a s  a prob- 
l e m .  I b e l i e v e  t h a t  to  t h e  r e s p o n s i b l e  manager, c o n t r o l  i s  always 
-
bo th  a s o l u t i o n  and a problem, and he w i l l  b e  w i s e  n o t  t o  mis take  
t h e  s o l u t i o n s  f o r  problems ( a  Type I e r r o r )  o r  t h e  problems f o r  
s o l u t i o n s  ( a  Type I1 e r r o r )  . 
NOTES 
1. I p r e f e r  u s i n g  t h e  t e r m s  " f o r - p r o f i t w  and " n o t - f o r - p r o f i t "  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and a c t i v i t i e s  r a t h e r  t han  t h e  u s u a l  " p r o f i t "  
and "non -p ro f i t "  t o  stress the i n t e n t  of  making a  p r o f i t  or 
n o t ;  q u i t e  a  few f o r - p r o f i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
t u r n  o u t  t o  b e  n o n - p r o f i t .  
A t  t h e  E I A S M - I I A S A  workshop, P e r r i n  (1979) p r e s e n t e d  a  
" h i e r a r c h y "  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  t h e  UK based on  t h e  s i m i l a r -  
i t y  of  t h e i r  a c c o u n t i n g  p r a c t i c e s :  (1) p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e ;  
(2 )  n a t i o n a l i z e d  i n d u s t r i e s ,  such  a s  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Coal  
Board; ( 3 )  p u b l i c  u t i l i t i e s ;  ( 4 )  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Hea l t h  S e r v i c e ;  
( 5) government o f f  ices. Thus, w i t h i n  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r ,  
n a t i o n a l i z e d  i n d u s t r i e s  a r e  m o s t  l i k e  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  
from a n  accoun t i ng  p o i n t  o f  view. 
3. Anthony and ~ e r z l i n g e r  (1975: 9f f )  d i v i d e  (US) not - for-prof  it 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n t o  c l i e n t - o r i e n t e d ,  member-oriented, and 
p u b l i c - o r i e n t e d ,  and a r g u e  t h a t  the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  management 
c o n t r o l  i n  such  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h i s  o r d e r .  
4 .  I n  E a s t e r n  European c o u n t r i e s ,  a l l  e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  no t - fo r -  
p r o f i t .  I n  Po land ,  Beksiak  and Czarniawska (1977) have 
used e x t e n s i v e  p a r t i c i p a n t  o b s e r v a t i o n  t o  a r r i v e  a t  a  typ- 
o logy  of e n t e r p r i s e s  based  on  t h e i r  r e sponse  to  t h e i r  env i -  
ronment ( h i g h e r  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  o t h e r  e n t e r p r i s e s  a s  c o n t r a c -  
tors ,  and consumer s ) .  They f i n d  t h a t  some e n t e r p r i s e s  
stress s a t i s f y i n g  consumers ("consumer-oriented"), some 
stress s a t i s f y i n g  a u t h o r i t i e s  ( " o b e d i e n t " ) ,  some o n l y  stress 
s a t i s f y i n g  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s  ( "comfor t -seeking")  , and 
o t h e r s  combine two or more of t h e s e  o r i e n t a t i o n s ,  p o s s i b l y  
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a  f o u r t h  o r i e n t a t i o n  towards  c o n t r a c t o r s .  
I n  an  e a r l i e r  p u b l i c a t i o n  (Hofs tede,  1978) I d i scussed  t h e  
c r i t e r i a  1, 2 and 4 .  Thompson (1967: 134) c l a s s i f i e s  c o n t r o l  
d e c i s i o n  p roces ses  by t h e  c r i t e r i a  1 and 3  ( " c e r t a i n t y  v s .  
u n c e r t a i n t y  about  p re fe rences  r ega rd ing  p o s s i b l e  outcomes", 
and " b e l i e f s  abou t  c a u s e / e f f e c t  r e l a t i o n s  c e r t a i n  v s .  uncer- 
t a i n " )  . 
Say le s  (1972:30) r e f e r s  t o  t h e  " tendency f o r  e a s i l y  q u a n t i -  
f i e d  measures t o  d r i v e  o u t  more s u b j e c t i v e  o n e s n - - t h i s  i s  a 
Gresham's Law of o u t p u t  measurement. 
A t  t he  EIASM-IIASA workshop, Hermant (1979) d i scus sed  
" s t r a t e g i c  c o n t r o l s  i n  Business  Schools" ,  and argued t h e s e  
had t o  be (1) v a l i d :  based on measurable  d a t a ;  (2 )  coheren t :  
making d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s  of t h e  s t r a t e g y  f i t  t o g e t h e r ;  and 
( 3) adequate  : d i s p o s i n g  of proper  methods and procedures  . 
A t  t h e  EIASM-IIASA workshop, F i s c h e r  (1979) d i s c u s s e d  t h e  
r o l e  of t h e  " r e t i c u l i s t "  o r  network f a c i l i t a t o r  who a c t s  a s  
a n  in format ion  and media t ion  l i n k  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n t r o l  of i n t e r - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  networks.  
Weick (1974) c r i t i c i z e s  a  number o f  assumptions t h a t  a r e  
made when o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a r e  p i c t u r e d  a s  (open) systems and 
warns e x p l i c i t l y  a g a i n s t  t h e  c y b e r n e t i c  model: "be susp i -  
c ious  of thermos t a t s "  . 
Birnberg,  e t  a l .  (1977) sugges t s  t h e  u s e  of " a t t r i b u t i o n  
theoryn  t o  e x p l a i n  human behavior  i n  c o n t r o l  sys tems.  A t t r i -  
b u t i o n  theory  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n  t o  which causes  people  
a t t r i b u t e  even t s ;  t h e s e  a t t r i b u t i o n s  depend p a r t l y  on t h e  
a t t r i b u t o r s ,  p a r t l y  on t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  Bi rnberg ,  e t  a 1  ., 
expand t h e  c y b e r n e t i c  model t o  r e f l e c t  a t t r i b u t i o n  p roces ses .  
A t t r i b u t i o n  theo ry  among o t h e r  t h i n g s  e x p l a i n s  why d i f f e r e n t  
people r e a c t  d i f f e r e n t l y  t o  t h e  same feedback s i g n a l .  
I n  t h i s  l i n e ,  Hedberg and Jdnsson (1978) defend t h e  d e s i g n  
o f  semi-confusing in fo rma t ion  systems f o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  
changing environments ,  which h e l p  t o  p rope r ly  d e s t a b i l i z e  
- 
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  make i t  adap t ive .  
Hammond and Adelman (1978) propose a  normative model of  
p o l i c y  decision-making i n  which supposedly r a t i o n a l  e x p e r t ' s  
judgments a r e  weighed by p o l i t i c i a n s '  va lue  judgments. 
S t r i n g e r  (1976:35) p o i n t s  t o  t h e  r i t u a l  e lements  i n  employ- 
ment and unemployment. 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a n x i e t y ,  a  need f o r  r u l e s ,  and a  
"Ques t  f o r  Con t ro l "  has  e a r l i e r  been recognized by Van 
Gunsteren (1976) . 
One s tudy  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ,  non-economic 
a s p e c t s  of inves tment  budgets  i s  Bower (1970) ; s e e  page 7. 
16 .  A r a t h e r  s i m i l a r  s t a t e m e n t  was made on t h e  b a s i s  of  r e s e a r c h  
i n  PPBS-inspired reforms i n  the Belg ian  M i n i s t r y  of French- 
language Educa t ion ,  i n  a  pape r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  E I A S M - I I A S A  
workshop by Luc Wi lk in  ( a s  y e t  unpubl ished)  . 
17. I n  my own management c o n t r o l  t e a c h i n g ,  I have used t h e  Type 
I--Type I1 e r r o r  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e f o r e  I r e c e i v e d  t h e  Landau 
and S t o u t  paper ;  w e  have come independen t ly  t o  t h e  same 
analogy . 
18 .  E x t e n s i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  Type I1 e r r o r s  a r e  found i n  Wildavsky 
(1975) and Van Gunsteren (1976) . 
1 9 .  Beer (1975: 497) d e s c r i b e s  such  a  system: "The crisis u s u a l l y  
a r r i v e s  when t h e  b o s s e s  of the t o t a l  sys tem p e r c e i v e  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  a s  a  v e r i t a b l e  chaos  t hey  can b a r e l y  i n f l u e n c e ,  
w h i l e  a t  t h e  same time t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  running t h e  p a r t s  
p e r c e i v e  a n  a u t o c r a t i c  regime t h a t  t ies  t h e i r  hands .  The 
b o s s e s  see themselves  a s  u t t e r i n g  genuine  policies--mere 
p r e s c r i p t i o n s ;  t h o s e  a t  t h e  lower l e v e l  r e c e i v e  i n h i b i t i n g  
rules- -genuine  p r o s c r i p t i o n s " .  
20. March now d i f f e r s  s t r o n g l y  w i t h  h i s  co-author  i n  t h e i r  1963 
"Behaviora l  Theory o f  the Firm", R.M. Cyer t ,  on t h e  p r i n -  
c i p l e s  on  which (US) u n i v e r s i t i e s  shou ld  b e  managed. C y e r t  
(who h a s  become a  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s i d e n t )  h a s  come to  defend- 
i n g  a h i g h l y  fo rma l i zed ,  c e n t r a l i z e d  o b j e c t i v e - s e t t i n g -  
p l ann ing  and budge t ing  o p e r a t i o n ,  i n  r a d i c a l  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  
March ( D i l l ,  1975) . 
21. A t  t h e  EIASM-IIASA workshop, Mtlller d i s c u s s e d  a  p a p e r  by 
Mtlller and Vogelsang (1978) abou t  t h e  u s e  of  e x t e r n a l  com- 
mittees t o  s u p e r v i s e  t h e  p o l i c y  making of  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  
i n  Germany, us ing  a  US example; t h e  paper  conc ludes  t h a t  
t h i s  approach is  i n e f f e c t i v e .  A l s o  a t  t h e  workshop, H a r r i s  
(1979) d i s c u s s e d  t h e  a u d i t i n g  r o l e  of  c e n t r a l  government o n  
c o r p o r a t e  p lann ing  f o r  t h e  UK n a t i o n a l i z e d  i n d u s t r i e s ;  indus-  
tr ies want more g u i d e l i n e s  and fewer  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  from 
government. Viens (1979) d e a l t  w i t h  c o s t  c o n t r o l  i n  hos- 
p i t a l s  and sugges ted  a  compar ison between h o s p i t a l s  based 
on  c o s t  i n d i c e s  a s  a  way of  a u d i t i n g  c o s t .  H i s  examples 
were based  on US expe r i ence .  
22. Michael  (1973) o f f e r s  a  g rand  d e s i g n  f o r  "Long Range S o c i a l  
P l ann ingn  through "Future-Responsive S o c i e t a l  Lea rn ing" .  
H e  t a k e s  i s s u e  w i th  t h e  " d i s g r u n t l e d  inc rementa l i sm"  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s  l i k e  Lindblom and Wildavsky . I am 
a f r a i d  h i s  s o l u t i o n  i s  p s y c h o l o g i s t i c  ( f o c u s s i n g  on i n d i -  
v i d u a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  change) and t h e r e f o r e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  
na ive ,  and t h a t  a  p rocedure  l i k e  h e  proposes  would i n  f a c t  
i n c r e a s e  r i g i d i t y  r a t h e r  t h a n  d e c r e a s e  it. 
REFERENCES 
Abt,  C.C.  (1976) The   valuation o f  S o c i a l  Programs.  B e v e r l y  
H i l l s ,  C a l i f .  : Sage  P u b l i c a t i o n s .  
Aharoni ,  Y . (1971) C o s t  E f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  Budgetary  D e c i s i o n  P r o c e s s  
and I t e m i z a t i o n :  Some B e h a v i o r a l  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  Working 
P a p e r  N o .  193.  S t a n f o r d ,  C a l i f .  : Gradua te  S c h o o l  o f  
B u s i n e s s ,  S t a n f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y .  
Anthony, R . N .  (196 5) P l a n n i n g  and C o n t r o l  Systems:  A Framework 
f o r  A n a l y s i s .  Bos ton ,  Mass.: D i v i s i o n  of  Resea rch ,  Gradua te  
S c h o o l  o f  B u s i n e s s ,  Harva rd  U n i v e r s i t y .  
Anthony, R .N .  (1972) Management Accoun t ing  f o r  t h e  F u t u r e .  S l o a n  
Management Review, 1 3 ,  3:17-34. 
Anthony, R . N .  and R.E. H e r z l i n g e r  (1975) Management C o n t r o l  i n  
Non-Prof i t  O r g a n i z a t i o n s .  Homewood, I l l .  : I r w i n .  
A r g y r i s ,  C . (1977) Double-Loop L e a r n i n g  i n  O r g a n i z a t i o n s .  Harvard  
B u s i n e s s  Review, 55, 5: 115-125. 
Ashby, W.R. (1956) I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  C y b e r n e t i c s .  New York: Wiley . 
Ashby, W.R. (1965) ~ e s i g n  f o r  a B r a i n .  London: Chapman 6, H a l l .  
B a r i f f ,  M.L. and J . L .  G a l b r a i t h  (1978) I n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  Power 
C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  f o r  ~ e s i g n i n g  I n f o r m a t i o n  Sys tems.  Account- 
i n g ,  O r g a n i z a t i o n s  and S o c i e t y ,  3, 1 :15-27. 
B e e r ,  S .  (1975) Immanent Forms o f  Imminent C r i s i s .  Systems and  
Management Annual,  4 85-499 . 
Beksiak ,  J .  and B .  ~ z a r n i a w s k a  (1977) E n t e r p r i s e  Response P a t t e r n s  
Under t h e  S o c i a l i s t  Management Sys tem.  Oeconomica Polona ,  
2,  211-228. 
B i r n b e r g ,  J . G . ,  I . H .  F r i e z e ,  and M.D. S h i e l d s  (1977) The Role o f  
A t t r i b u t i o n  Theory i n  C o n t r o l  Sys tems .  Account ing ,  Organiza-  
t i o n s  and S o c i e t y ,  2, 3 ,  189-200. 
B o w e r ,  J . L .  (1970) Managing t h e  Resource  A l l o c a t i o n  Process. 
Homewood, I1 1. : I r w i n .  
Bruns, W . J .  and J . H .  Waterhouse (1975) Budgetary  C o n t r o l  and 
O r g a n i z a t i o n  S t r u c t u r e .  J o u r n a l  o f  Account ing  Research ,  
1 3 ,  2, 177-203. 
C a n t l e y ,  M.F. (1973) C o r p o r a t e  P lann ing :  A Review o f  Q u e s t i o n s  
and Answers,  Omega, 1, 1, 55-77. 
C a n t l e y ,  M.F. (1978) S t r a t e g i c  C o n t r o l  f o r  a UK Regional  H e a l t h  
Authori ty--A Conceptual  Framework, Resea rch  Memorandum 
RM-78-54. Laxenburg,  A u s t r i a :  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  
Appl ied  Sys tems A n a l y s i s .  
C a n t l e y ,  M.F. (1979) Mid-Projec t  O b s e r v a t i o n s  from a  Study o f  
S t r a t e g i c  M o n i t o r i n g .  Working P a p e r  WP-79- 57. Laxenburg, 
A u s t r i a :  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Appl ied  Systems A n a l y s i s .  
Cheek, L.M. (1977) Zero-Base Budget ing  C o m e s  o f  Age: What I t  Is 
and What I t  Takes to  Make I t  Work. New York: Amacom. 
C r o z i e r ,  M. (1964) The B u r e a u c r a t i c  Phenomenon. Chicago: Univer- 
s i t y  o f  Chicago Press. 
C y e r t ,  R.M. and J . G .  March (1963) A B e h a v i o r a l  Theory of the 
Firm.  Englewood C l i f  is, N .J. : P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,  
den Her tog ,  J .F .  (1978) The Role o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  and C o n t r o l  
Systems i n  t h e  Process o f  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  Renewal: Roadblock 
or Road Br idge?  Accounting,  O r g a n i z a t i o n s  and S o c i e t y ,  3, 
1, 29-45. 
D e r l i e n ,  H.U. (1978a) Methodische Probleme d e r  e m p i r i s c h e n  V e r -  
w a l t u n g s f o r s c h u n g  (Problems o f  Method i n  E m p i r i c a l  Resea rch  
i n  P u b l i c  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n )  . S c h r i f t e n r e i h e ,  N r  . 9 ,  Bonn: 
V e r e i n  f a r  Verwal tungsreform und Verwal tungsforschung.  
D e r l i e n ,  H.U. (1978b) Ursachen und E r f o l g  von S t r u k t u r r e f o r m e n  
i m  B e r e i c h  der Bundes reg ie rung  u n t e r  b e s o n d e r e r  BerUck- 
s i c h t i g u n g  d e r  wissenschaf  t l i c h e n  Bera tung  (Causes  and 
R e s u l t s  o f  S t r u c t u r a l  Reforms i n  the F e d e r a l  Government, 
Wi th  S p e c i a l  A t t e n t i o n  t o  S c i e n t i f i c  C o u n s e l l i n g )  . Pages 
67-87, Verwal tungsreformen und p o l i t i s c h e  W i s s e n s c h a f t ,  
edited by C .  B o e h r e t .  Baden-Baden: N o m o s .  
D i l l ,  W.R. (1975) When Auld ~ c q u a i n t a n c e  B e  Forgo t  .,, From C y e r t  
and March t o  C y e r t  v s .  March, Pages  63-71 i n  The Management 
o f  N o n p r o f i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s :  W i t h  Emphasis o n  U n i v e r s i t i e s ,  
by R. M. C y e r t  , ~ e x i n g t o n ,  Mass.: ~ e x i n g t o n  Books. 
Draper ,  F.D. and B.T. P i t s v a d a  (1979) Zero-Base ~ u d g e t i n g  f o r  
P u b l i c  Programs.  Washington D.C.: U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s  o f  
America. 
Dunbar, R.L .M. (1971) Budget ing  f o r  C o n t r o l .  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
S c i e n c e  Q u a r t e r l y ,  16 ,  1, 88-96. 
Emery, F.E. and E.L. T r i s t  (1969) The C a u s a l  T e x t u r e  o f  Organiza-  
t i o n a l  Environments .  Pages  241-257 i n  Systems Thinking,  
e d i t e d  by F.E . Emery, Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin .  
F i s c h e r ,  D .  (1979) J o i n t  P o l i c y  Assessment:  The R e t i c u l i s t  . P a p e r  
p r e s e n t e d  a t  EIASM-IIASA workshop, B r u s s e l s ,  A p r i l .  
F lamhol tz ,  E .G.  (1979) Toward a Psycho-Technica l  Systems Paradigm 
o f  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  Measurement. D e c i s i o n  S c i e n c e ,  1 0 ,  71-84. 
Hammond, K.R.  and L .  Adelman (1978) S c i e n c e ,  Values  and Human 
Judgment.  Pages 119-141 i n  Judgment and D e c i s i o n  i n  P u b l i c  
P o l i c y  Format ion ,  e d i t e d  by K . R .  Hammond. Boulder, C o l . :  
Westview P r e s s .  
H a r r i s ,  D . J .  (1979) C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  a s  a C o n t r o l  System i n  UK 
N a t i o n a l i z e d  I n d u s t r i e s .  P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  EIASM-IIASA 
workshop, B r u s s e l s ,  A p r i l .  
Hedberg, B .  and S . JBnsson (1978) Des ign ing  Semi-confusing I n f o r -  
ma t ion  Sys  tems f o r  O r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  Changing Environments  . 
Account ing ,  O r g a n i z a t i o n s  and S o c i e t y ,  3, 2, 47-67. 
Hermant, J.  ( 1979) S t r a t e g i c  C o n t r o l s  i n  B u s i n e s s  Schools-- 
De te rminan t s  and C o n s t r a i n t s .  P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  EIASM- 
IIASA workshop, B r u s s e l s ,  A p r i l .  
Hervey, L. (1978) Moni tor ing  H e a l t h  Care  P l a n n i n g  f o r  the E l d e r l y  
i n  t h e  UK N a t i o n a l  H e a l t h  S e r v i c e :  A Review of t h e  Genera l  
Research  Problems.  Working P a p e r  WP-78-53. Laxenburg, 
A u s t r i a :  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Appl ied  Systems 
A n a l y s i s .  
H e r z l i n g e r ,  R.E.  (1979) Zero-Base Budget ing  i n  t h e  F e d e r a l  Govern- 
ment: A Case  S t u d y .  S l o a n  Management ~ e v i e w ,  20, 1, 3-14. 
Hofs tede ,  G .  (1967) The Game o f  Budget C o n t r o l .  Assen, Neth: 
Van Gorcum and London: T a v i s t o c k  . 
Hofs tede ,  G .  (1976) P e o p l e  and Techn iques  i n  Budget ing .  Pages  
10-22 i n  ~ u a n t i t a t i v e  Methods i n  Budget ing ,  e d i t e d  by 
C.B.  T i l a n u s ,  Leyden, Neth.:  M a r t i n u s  N i j h o f f .  
Hofs tede ,  G .  (1977) C u l t u r a l  De te rminan t s  o f  t h e  Avoidance o f  
U n c e r t a i n t y  i n  O r g a n i z a t i o n s .  Working Paper  77-18. B r u s s e l s :  
European I n s  ti t u t e  for Advanced S t u d i e s  i n  Management. 
H o f s  t e d e ,  G . (1978) The P o v e r t y  o f  Management C o n t r o l  P h i l o s o p h y .  
Academy o f  Management Review, 3, 3, 450-461. 
Hofs tede ,  G .  (1979) Value Systems i n  F o r t y  C o u n t r i e s :  I n t e r p r e t a -  
t i o n ,  V a l i d a t i o n ,  and Consequences f o r  Theory.  Pages 389- 
407 i n  Cross -Cul tu ra l  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  to  Psychology,  e d i t e d  
by L.H. Eckensberger ,  W.J. Lonner and Y .H. P o o r t i n g a .  L i s s e ,  
Aeth.:  Swets 6 Z e i t l i n g e r .  
f Iofs tede ,  G .  (1980) Angola Coffee--Or t h e  C o n f r o n t a t i o n  o f  an  
Organ i za t i on  w i t h  Changing Values i n  i t s  Environment.  
Organ i za t i on  S t u d i e s ,  1, 1, 21-40. 
Ho l l i ng ,  C.S. (1973) R e s i l i e n c e  and S t a b i l i t y  o f  E c o l o g i c a l  
Systems.  Annual Review o f  Ecology and S y s t e m a t i c s ,  4 ,  1-23 
( a l s o  pub l i shed  a s  Research Repor t  RR-73-3, Laxenburg, 
A u s t r i a :  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Appl ied  Systems 
Ana lys i s )  . 
Hulshof ,  A.H. (1979) C o n t r o l  Systems i n  Non-Prof i t  Organ i za t i ons .  
Paper  p r e s e n t e d  a t  EIASM-IIASA workshop, B r u s s e l s ,  ~ p r i l .  
Ivancev ich ,  J . M .  (1974) Changes i n  Performance i n  a  Management 
By O b j e c t i v e s  Program. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  S c i e n c e  Q u a r t e r l y ,  
19 ,  563-577. 
Jab lonsky ,  S  .F. and M.W. Dirsmi th  (1978) The P a t t e r n  o f  PPB 
Re jec t i on :  Something About Organ i za t i on  S t r u c t u r e ,  Something 
About PPB. ~ c c o u n t i n g ,  Organ i za t i ons  and S o c i e t y ,  3, 3/4, 
215-225. 
Landau, M .  and R .  S t o u t  (1979) To Manage i s  Not t o  Cont ro l :  O r  
t h e  F o l l y  of  Type I1 E r r o r s .  P u b l i c  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  Review, 
39,2 ,  148-156. 
Lindblom, C.E.  (1959) The Sc i ence  o f  Muddling Through. P u b l i c  
Admin i s t r a t i on  Review, 19 ,  2, 78-88. 
Lyden, F. J.  and E .G. Miller (1972) P l ann ing  Programming Budgeting: 
A Systems Approach t o  Management, 2nd Ed. Chicago: Rand 
McNal l y  . 
Machin, J . L  .J . (1975) Management A p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  Expec t a t i ons  
Approach: Management Summary Repor t  No. 0077. P e t e r l e e ,  
Durham: I B M  UK S c i e n t i f i c  Cen t r e .  
Machin, J .L .J. (1977) Using the E x p e c t a t i o n s  Approach t o  Improve 
Manager ia l  communication and O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  E f f e c t i v e n e s s .  
Management ~ e c i s i o n ,  15 ,  2, 259-277. 
Machin, J . L . J .  (1978) Management Con t ro l  Systems: Whence and 
Whither? Working Paper  33. Durham: Durham U n i v e r s i t y  
Bus iness  School .  
March, J .G. and J .P.  O l sen  (1976) Ambiguity and Choice  i n  Organ- 
i z a t i o n s .  Bergen, Norway: U n i v e r s i t e t s f o r l a g e t .  
Michael ,  D . N .  (1973) On Learn ing  t o  P l a n  and P l ann ing  t o  Learn: 
The S o c i a l  Psychology o f  Changing Toward Future-Responsive 
S o c i e t a l  Learn ing .  San F ranc i s co :  Jossey-Bass  . 
Maller, J.  and I .  Vogelsang (1978) 1st e i n e  E f f i z i e n z s t e i g e r u n g  
d e r  d f f e n t l i c h e n  Verwaltung d u r c h  Anwendung d e s  I n s t r u m e n t -  
a r iums  d e r  a m e r i k a n i s c h e n  " P u b l i c  U t i l i t y  R e g u l a t i o n "  
mbglich? (Can t h e  E f f i c i e n c y  o f  P u b l i c  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  be 
Improved th rough  Using t h e  T o o l s  o f  t h e  US P u b l i c  U t i l i t y  
R e g u l a t i o n s ? )  . Pages  775-793 i n  Verhandlungen a u f  d e r  
A r b e i t s t a g u n g  d e s  V e r e i n s  ff i r  S o z i a l p o l i t i k  . Monster ,  1977.  
B e r l i n :  Duncker 6 Humblot. 
P e r r i n ,  J. (1979) C o n t r o l  i n  t h e  N a t i o n a l  H e a l t h  S e r v i c e  o f  t h e  
United Kingdom. P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  EIASM-IIASA workshop. 
B r u s s e l s ,  A p r i l .  
S a r a n t ,  P.C. (1978) Zero-Base Budgeting i n  t h e  P u b l i c  S e c t o r :  A 
P r a g m a t i c  Approach. ~ e a d i n g ,  Mass. : Addison Wesley.  
S a y l e s ,  L ,  (1972) The Many Dimensions o f  C o n t r o l .  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
Dynamics, 1, 1, 21-31. 
Schon, D.A. (1971) Beyond t h e  S t a b l e  S t a t e .  London: Temple 
Smith .  
S e l b y ,  C .C. (1978) Better Performance  from ' N o n p r o f i t s  I .  Harvard 
Bus iness  ~ e v i e w ,  56, 5 ,  92-98. 
S l o v i c ,  P  , (1978) Judgment,  Choice  and S o c i e t a l  R i sk  Tak ing .  
Pages 98-111 i n  Judgment and D e c i s i o n  i n  P u b l i c  P o l i c y  
Formation,  e d i t e d  by W.R, Hammond, Bou lder ,  Co l , :  Westview 
P r e s s .  
S t r i n g e r ,  J.  (1976) O p e r a t i o n a l  Research  and P u b l i c  P o l i c y :  Some 
Thoughts .  P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  Second I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Research  
Conference  o n  O.R. ,  S t r a t f o r d  o n  Avon, A p r i l  1976.  London: 
I n s t i t u t e  f o r  O p e r a t i o n a l  Resea rch .  
Thompson, J ,D.  (1967) O r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  A c t i o n .  N e w  York: McGraw 
H i l l ,  
Todd, J. (1977) Management C o n t r o l  Systems:  A Key Link Between 
S t r a t e g y ,  S t r u c t u r e  and Employee Performance .  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
Dynamics, 5,  4 ,  65-78. 
van d e  V a l l ,  M .  and C. B o l a s  (1977) P o l i c y  Resea rch  a s  an  Agent 
o f  P lanned S o c i a l  I n t e r v e n t i o n :  An E v a l u a t i o n  o f  Methods, 
S t a n d a r d s ,  Data, and A n a l y t i c  Techn iques .  S o c i o l o g i c a l  
P r a c t i c e ,  2, 2, 77-95. 
van Gunsteren ,  H . R .  (1976) The Q u e s t  f o r  c o n t r o l :  A c r i t i q u e  of 
t h e  Ra t iona l -Cen t ra l -Rule  Approach i n  P u b l i c  A f f a i r s ,  London: 
W i  l e y .  
Vayda, A.P. and B , J .  McCay (1975) N e w  D i r e c t i o n s  i n  Ecology and 
E c o l o g i c a l  Anthropology.  Annual Review o f  Anthropology,  4 ,  
293-306. 
Viens ,  G.  (1979)  1 ' I n d i c e  d e  ~ h & r e t & :  Un E ' l 6ment  du  Sys tgme d e  
~ o n t r 8 l e  d e s  E t a b l i s s e m e n t  I i o s p i t a l i e r s  e t  un Moyen d e  Com- 
p a r e r  les cofits d e s  ~ r a i t e m e n t s ?  (The  D e a r t h  I n d e x :  An 
Elemen t  f o r  a  c o n t r o l  Sys tem f o r  H o s p i t a l s  and  Means o f  
Comparing t h e  C o s t  o f  T r e a t m e n t s ? ) .  P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  
EIASM-IIASA workshop.  B r u s s e l s ,  A p r i l .  
Weick, K.E.  (1974) Middle  Range T h e o r i e s  o f  S o c i a l  S y s t e m s .  
B e h a v i o r a l  S c i e n c e ,  1 9 ,  357-369. 
Wholey, J .S . (1 978) Zero-Base ~ u d g e t i n g  a n d  Program E v a l u a t i o n ,  
L e x i n g t o n ,  Mass.: L e x i n g t o n  Books. 
Wildavsky , A .  (1972)  The S e l f - E v a l u a t i n g  O r g a n i z a t i o n  . P u b l i c  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  Review, 5 ,  509-520. 
Wi ldavsky ,  A. (1975)  Budget ing:  A Compara t ive  Theory  o f  t h e  
Budge ta ry  P r o c e s s .  Bos ton:  L i t t l e ,  Brown & Co. 
Wildavsky ,  A .  (1978a)  P o l i c y  A n a l y s i s  is  What I n f o r m a t i o n  Sys t ems  
A r e  Not.  Accoun t ing ,  O r g a n i z a t i o n s  and S o c i e t y ,  3, 1, 
77-88. 
Wi ldavsky ,  A .  (1978b)  A Budge t  f o r  A l l  S e a s o n s ?  Why t h e  T r a d i -  
t i o n a l  Budget  Las t s .  Mimeographed p r e p r i n t  f o r  a n  a r t i c l e  
i n  S t a t e  ~ u d i t ,  a  book i n  honor  o f  I .E .  N e b e n s a h l .  
